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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the role of settlers in maintaining settlement in Canada. I 
problematize settler bodies to deliberate on their potential for performing decolonization. 
My discussion seeks to complicate theoretical approaches that position the onto-
epistemological stance of the settler as their impediment to decolonizing action. Drawing 
from the fields of phenomenology and affect theory, I discuss habit formation in bodies. I 
use case studies that discuss settler-Indigenous land relations to ground these theories of 
habit. I look to Indigenous leaders, artists and scholars, who offer valuable insights into the 
habituations of settlement as an institutionalized arrangement and a mode of behavior. I 
argue that settlement is a structure that emerges through settler bodies by way of their 
everyday being in the world. Performing settlement is therefore a habitual tendency for the 
settler who knows themselves in the world. A program for decolonization must address 
these habitual faculties beyond inducing an epistemological shift. I examine and confront 
settlers’ habitual tendencies to consider how they can shift their bodily habits and why they 
might want to take up the task of decolonization. I conclude with an initial framework for 
bringing settlers to the difficult work of confronting the legacy of colonialism and forging 
respectful treaty relations with Canada’s Indigenous sovereign partners. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords 
Merleau-Ponty; Critical Phenomenology; Phenomenology; The Habit Body; Settler 
Colonial Studies, Post-Colonial Studies; The Settler Habit Body; Settler-Indigenous Land 
Relations in Canada; Decolonizing Settlers. 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Summary for Lay Audience 
Contemporary settlement in Canada is not an equitable arrangement that sufficiently 
recognizes and respects the sovereignties and treaty rights of Indigenous groups. Many 
settler Canadians remain unaware that the land they live on and the national economy they 
participate in is bound up with colonialism. Contrary to what has been implied in our 
national discourses of apology and multiculturalism, colonialism in Canada is not a past 
event. Treaties that were signed at the inception of the Canadian state were agreements 
meant to forge fair use of lands. Over the course of Canada’s history, those agreements 
were not upheld by the settler state. The current system of settlement was built upon these 
inequitable relations, which means contemporary settlers continue to benefit from a 
structure that has never sufficiently been restructured. 
The question of how we can bring about more equitable relations is often difficult for 
settlers to confront. In addition to the financial implications of steps like land repatriation, 
how settlers feel about returning lands to Indigenous groups often deters them from action. 
While some have argued that settlers need to be more open-minded, I argue that settlement 
is in the bodily habits of settlers. These habits come in the form of work, play, and general 
day-to-day activities that bring us success within the social an economic structure that is 
settlement. It is through these activities that settlers feel settlement, such as the sense of 
pride, security or insecurity, and/or the anticipation of future happiness. This thesis looks 
to the sensing and emotional faculties of settlers to understand the ways that their habits of 
settlement can be re-directed towards creating new habits of decolonization. I draw from 
the fields of phenomenology and affect theory to discuss habit formation in bodies. I look 
to specific case studies that discuss settler-Indigenous land relations to ground these 
theories of habit. I also look to Indigenous leaders, artists and scholars, who offer valuable 
insights into the habituations of settlement as a structure and a mode of behavior. I conclude 
by offering a basic framework for bringing settlers to the difficult work of decolonization.  
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Introduction 
My introduction to the theory and praxis of researching settlement in Canada came 
to me in the form of two settler scholars whose work changed the course of my studies. 
The first is Amber Dean, whose writing on disappeared Indigenous women and what 
defines whose lives and deaths matter in the context of colonial Canada reshaped my 
understanding of systemic violence. It is from Dean’s work that I became attuned to the 
need for intersectional analyses for interrogating the particularities of institutionalized 
oppression, especially when it concerns the lives, disappearances, and deaths of Indigenous 
peoples. The second is Eva Mackey, whose ethnographic work I largely draw upon in this 
thesis to contemplate further the problem she terms “settler certainty,” which she defines 
as the ontological certainty of settler entitlement to lands that is based on the myth of solo 
settler sovereignty.1 While Dean’s work helped me make the division between the lived 
conditions of settler and Indigenous peoples perceivable, Mackey’s insights gave me the 
sense for how multiculturalism and Indigeneity are utilized by the state in interconnected 
ways to serve the outcomes of settlement. These two scholars brought me to understand 
colonialism as a system in which I was embedded and that I benefitted from in ways that 
were distinct from others. It is from their work that I began to feel certain about wanting 
things to be different. 
I write about the knowing I acquired from reading Dean and Mackey’s works 
because it is indicative of a much bigger and problematic issue in settler culture. Why is it 
that I learned about my privilege in Canadian society from two settler scholars when the 
works of Indigenous scholars, leaders, and artists who have taken up the task of resistance 
and critique have always been available? It is not as if I was unaware that Indigenous 
perspectives and resistance to settlement was present in my world. To focus on one 
example –although there have been many – I have vivid memories of watching the Oka 
protests broadcast on the news when I was 14 years of age. At that time, I was very 
uncertain as to why a golf course should be such a big deal. While I thought the developers 
 
1 Eva Mackey, Unsettled, 132.  
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were aggressive, I also felt that perhaps the “Mohawk” should just give up on the spectacle 
they were creating before they got hurt.2 Development happened everywhere and felt 
inevitable, which meant the protestors were being incredibly provocative by demanding 
otherwise.  
Clearly, I was aware that there was a settler problem because I could see and hear 
about that problem on my television, in my family home, and as it was discussed in my 
social circles. These conversations were – as far as I can recall at present – with other 
settlers and they consisted of criticisms or support for the protestors’ claims, mainly to 
bolster the opinions of all who wanted to take up space in the lively debate. I wonder now 
how much of the protestors I actually heard after they were filtered through news editing 
and the opinions of those around me.  
The problem then was not that I did not hear and see Indigenous resistance and 
critique. The problem was perhaps that I only heard and saw a version of what they were 
saying, and I was perplexed about the facts surrounding the crisis. I very quickly learned 
that implying the protestors were wrong was the path of least resistance because fewer 
people in my community became angry about that stance and the ones who agreed with it 
calmly assured everyone that the government would shut it down. I was deeply frightened 
by the idea of said shut down and what it might mean for the protestors, but the confidence 
of the adults surrounding me made me feel better about finding a resolution. On the other 
hand, the people who did agree with the protesters became outraged; they would shout 
about facts that did not comply with what I understood to be correct about settler-
Indigenous land relations. As a western European, third-generation white settler whose 
family found their roots in Canada by way of building, buying and developing land, it 
seemed impossible to me that Indigenous people should have a say in how land is used. In 
other words, what was happening at Oka was confusing and a topic that was best to avoid 
with a nod and a shrug. Although I was fearful for the protestors, what they were fighting 
about did not appear to affect my life directly. 
 
2 Wakeham, 14. “Mohawk” is the settler ascribed name for Kanien ’kehaka people. 
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 I turn to a description of my experience of the Oka crisis because it communicates 
the limits of my ability at that time to intellectually comprehend the settler problem. 
Looking back, I might contemplate why I did not ask more questions to know more about 
the situation in hopes that perhaps I could have taken a more active role in the matter, even 
if that role was expressed just amongst my family, friends, and teachers. But to assume all 
I needed was better knowledge of the issue and how to bring that argument into a 
conversation was to overlook the feelings that kept me from acquiring that knowledge and 
expressing it.  
Most notably, my feelings of disorientation caused me to turn away from digging 
deeper, and I approached conversations regarding the matter by saying as little as possible, 
nodding and shrugging in repetition. Eventually, my body took up the habit of avoiding 
settler-Indigenous issues by walking away from conversations or putting my attention 
elsewhere because these events felt too difficult to confront. These instances were perhaps 
what Alia Al-Saji describes as “events for which we cannot account from within our 
instituted system of meaning.”3 This particular inassimilable event, the one in which a 
settler must interpret Indigenous resistance, is not a random event to be conflated with other 
difficult encounters. As Al-Saji points out, the event is understood relationally to instituted 
systems of hierarchical relations and are thus bolstered by different oppressive apparatuses. 
This is to say that my bodily attitude towards the Oka crisis would not have been the same 
as if I had, for example, witnessed a feminist protest. Furthermore, my reaction was also 
likely different from the bodily attitude of an Indigenous person observing the 
demonstration. The way that I responded was therefore specifically a settler response to a 
problem that felt incomprehensible, and my inclination to turn away became habitual 
because I turned away in repetition instead of making myself open to the problem. 
This thesis presents a phenomenology of the settler habit body to problematize the 
ways that settlers experience and perform settlement. I am interested in locating and 
 
3 Alia Al-Saji, “Critical-Ethical,” 11.  “These are [inassimilable] events for which we cannot account from within our 
instituted system of meaning – events that reveal, if we are open to them, the fractures in the coherence of the visual 
field.” 
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interrogation the affective and bodily habitual faculties of the settler that keep them from 
turning towards the challenges of living settlement. More specifically, settlement, as it 
exists today, is not an equitable arrangement towards Indigenous groups that recognizes 
and respects their sovereignties and treaty rights. I aim to explore in this thesis how the 
habitual tendencies of settlers bring settlement into existence, and what seeing settlement 
as habit means for changing the existing structure. But before I can unpack the concept of 
the settler habit body, it is necessary to introduce the habit body concept and situate its 
emergence in the field of phenomenology. 
While this thesis draws largely from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the habit 
body, habit, as it relates to consciousness, was not initially emergent as bodily 
comportment as Merleau-Ponty argues. In David Hume’s work, habits are considered a 
mental activity used to justify causality. While causality was once thought to concern 
objective features in the world, Hume’s work showed causality to be an experiential 
process in which we make meaning that constitutes our consciousness.4 For Hume, there 
is a difference between our inner perception – how we sense our inner selves – and 
introspection – how we reflect on our mental states. While inner perception is apparent to 
us because we are living it, introspection is highly complex and fallible. As Dermot Moran 
describes Hume’s position, “We cannot observe our own mental states while occupying 
them. Introspection can only distort the phenomena it seeks to study, we cannot observe 
our anger, without modifying it in some way.”5 Our inner state, as we move through it, 
cannot be located or found as an object for analysis because we are experiencing it. Hume, 
therefore, viewed reason as ill-equipped to justify causality, which he argues is habits of 
expectation. As Michael Hammond, Jane Howarth and Russell Keat describe, “Hume 
argued that one’s experience of causal connections should be analyzed in terms of the 
association (constant conjunction) of similar pairs of experiences in the past, built up so 
that one acquires habits of expectation (habitualities) that a particular type of event (labeled 
‘effect’) will follow another type of event (labelled ‘cause’).”6 Causality is therefore 
 
4 Moran, 139. 
5 Moran, 41. 
6 Hammond et. al., 84. 
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constructed when we imminently make meaning of the event, and what we understand as 
causal relations are actually our habitual tendencies to expect certain outcomes. 
 Edmund Husserl, much like Hume, thought of habituation as bound up with the 
ways that the subject encounters the world. For Husserl, the subject would not be a subject 
if they did not acquire habits.7 Habits are what the unified self has as its history or its 
genesis. The universals governing the genesis, as Husserl describes them, question how 
one is the subject they are and how they remain the same subject while they encounter new 
experiences.8 These two principals of genesis more specifically deal with “what is 
presented in experience (passive) and what is made of what is presented (active).”9 While 
passive encounters with objects are sensed experiences that can be described 
phenomenologically, active encounters are instances when we re-arrange physical objects 
and become productively active. In both cases, we rely on what we know, our habituations, 
in the encounter.    
Husserl examined the features of habituations and how they are acquired to develop 
his understanding concerning the laws of association that preside over habits of 
expectation. While he saw Hume’s laws of association to be empirical discoveries, he 
viewed his own to be eidetic because, they describe “a realm of the ‘innate’ a priori, without 
which an ego as such is unthinkable.”10 In which case, principal associations do not operate 
causally the way that Hume understood, wherein the meaning of events are imminently 
created. As Hammond et al. explain, “They provide the basis of all experience, including 
experience of causal connections. Any appeal to experience on the basis of which one could 
discern causality in operation would be an appeal to experience which itself is structured 
by these principals of association.”11 In other words, we can only recognize succession, 
contingency, and resemblance if we are already engaging our habituations. The universals 
 
7 Hammond et. al., 81. 
8 Husserl, 38. 
9 Hammond et. al., 81. 
10 Husserl, 81. 
11 Hammond et al., 84. 
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governing genesis are already at work, shaping our perception of the event as it is 
happening. 
While Hume and Husserl’s work on habitualities situated habit as theoretical and 
cognitive acts, Martin Heidegger emphasized the ordinary lived experiences of the body in 
the world. Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world sought to complicate the 
assumptions of modern materialism, which focused on the ways that objects in the world 
can be theoretically examined by disembodied subjects. Being-in-the-world was a 
substitute term for the divisive terms subject, object, consciousness and the world. 
Heidegger brought attention to the mundane everyday activities of living that allow 
theorization to be possible to work from the “primordial experiences in which we achieved 
our first ways of determining the nature of Being—the ways which have guided us ever 
since.”12 His work is described by Moran as “anti-Cartesian, anti-subjectivist, anti-dualist, 
and anti-intellectualist.”13 Distancing his work from the Husserlian concepts of 
phenomenology, which positioned cognition as the connection between humans and their 
world, Heidegger sought to free the thought of being from the philosophical propositions 
that he felt Husserl gave him to see with and instead cultivate a “pure naïveté.”14 He argues 
at the beginning of Being and Time that phenomenology is “opposed to all free-floating 
constructions and accidental findings,” and is instead a form of “self-evidence.”15 To be in 
the world, according to Heidegger, means the body is not separate parts – arms and legs – 
nor separate from the mind, but rather, it is to be an integrated bodily unit, situated in a 
specific time and space. As Eliot Deutsch has phrased it, “I am ‘embodied’ in the sense … 
that I am my body.”16  
Human existence, the body “being there” (Dasein), became for Heidegger a project 
that saw habit in a negative light. More specifically, he understands habituations to be a 
pre-reflective way of enacting social expressions that lack individual intelligibility, and as 
 
12 Heidegger, 44. 
13 Moran, 193. 
14 Moran, 228. 
15 Heidegger, 50. 
16 Deutsch, 5.  
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such, they express “an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility.”17 The individual, unaware 
of her actions in the present moment acts out what is in her but not really hers. According 
to James McGuirk’s reading of habituation in Heidegger, “Habitual ways of being and 
acting, as such, distract, uproot and alienate Dasein from being-in-the-world by dissolving 
individual Dasein into an inauthentic self-forgetfulness or an amorphous ‘they’ that is 
everyone and no-one.”18 While Heidegger’s take on habituation moves it from the 
cognitive and theoretical frame of Hume and Husserl into a complex being in the world 
that undermines mind-body dualism, it does not see habits as useful for understanding 
embodiment and consciousness.  
 In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty finds in habituation a certain 
productive quality for understanding the importance of the body’s being in the world. As 
McGuirk describes, for Merleau-Ponty, “habits are, in fact, crucial to the constitution of 
the individual as individual and to her constitution as knower of the world.”19 This 
rendering of habits undermines the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity and instead 
shows subjectivity and the body to be inextricably linked. By way of this link, subjects 
become naturalized or objectified. Habits in this sense, “enable[s] us to think the 
objectification process.”20 Subjectivity, for Merleau-Ponty, cannot be understood unless it 
is embodied and apprehended as constantly enmeshed with the phenomenal sensing body. 
His term the habit body is therefore not a doing away with consciousness, but a way of 
comprehending how consciousness comes into being. 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the habit body is useful for problematizing settler 
bodies because it supports a theorization of settlement as an embodied structure that is 
habitually taken up by settlers to create colonizing conditions in Canada. Seen through this 
lens, settlement is not a final destination but a constructed and thus malleable way of being 
in the world. Habits are maintained, to shift habits requires the body to do differently. Many 
 
17 Heidegger, 213. 
18 McGuirk, 150. 
19 McGuirk, 151.  
20 McGuirk, 151. 
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critiques of settler colonialism consider the ontological stance of settlers to be the main 
impediment to decolonizing action in the material world. I argue that this perspective 
delegitimizes the role that settler bodies being in the world plays in formulating their 
worldviews. The consciousness of the settler, who they know themselves to be, is a 
continuous construction of engagement with the world. This means that to know oneself 
as not the colonizer requires settler bodies to take up ways of extending into the world that 
are decolonizing. Intellectual or conceptual adjustments are not enough to change the 
current structure of settlement, which is at present an embodied, material, perceptual and 
thus affective structure that shapes the consciousness and expectations of settlers. 
Addressing the complexities of such a structure requires the work of a critical 
phenomenology of settlerness. 
My investigation of the settler habit body works through a critical phenomenology 
methodology. Classical phenomenology brings us to the transcendental ego to understand 
there is no meaningful experience without someone doing the experiencing, and it brings 
us beyond understanding ourselves as a bare cogito “I think.” As Lisa Guenther describes, 
“I think” is “in its most basic formulation, a relation or orientation of the thinker to the 
thought…I do not just think, I think thoughts, feel feelings, remember memories, and so 
forth.”21  While classical phenomenology illuminates the transcendental structures that 
shape our perception and habituations, it does not account for the ways that historical and 
social structures shape our experiential events.  
While I find Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the habit body to be a fantastic starting 
point, it is insufficient in itself to properly account for the lineage construction that is 
settlement in contemporary Canada. More specifically, his reading of the habit body is 
essential for understanding the formation of habit, but not necessarily the formation of 
settlement as habit. To proceed past these limitations, I look to critical phenomenology 
theorists, mainly Helen Ngo, Sara Ahmed and Alia Al-Saji, to further explicate the 
influences and pressures that settlers endure under the hegemonic structures of settlement. 
I read these theorists in coordination with analytical and ethnographic work from settler 
 
21 Lisa Guenther, 11. 
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colonial studies scholars, as well as Indigenous leaders, thinkers, artists and scholars, who 
offer valuable insights into the habituations of settlement as a structure and a mode of 
settler behavior. Most importantly, I ground this work in the Canadian context to situate 
decolonization in the particulars of Canada’s version of settlement.  I am invested in the 
work of decolonization in Canada as a settler scholar who aims to grapple with 
conceptualizing my own role in restructuring settlement towards more equitable ends. 
While this work is not a comprehensive critical phenomenology of settlerness, I aim to 
begin conceptualizing decolonization by problematizing the settler body within a 
descriptive and theory forward approach. 
 
The settler habit body is a term I employ to mean a body that pre-reflectively 
maintains settlement because its perceptual and responsive faculties habitually comply 
with the structure of settlement. The settler habit body is constructed at the intersection of 
concept, motion, and place because it maintains the abstractness of settlement in the 
material world. I see the settler habit body as what Ahmed might refer to as a “sweaty 
concept”: a concept that “resists being fully comprehended in the present,” and that 
requires description to make tangible its difficultness.22 Sweaty concepts require 
describing a situation that is complex or problematic in order to reveal what is conceptual 
about “the usual activity of life,” or in the case of settlers, what is pre-reflective.23 Concepts 
are at work in what we do; the concept of settlement is at work in what settlers do. To 
describe settler bodies is to make visible the patterns of habituation that they use to navigate 
their world. The work of decolonizing settler habit bodies is sweaty because it requires the 
physical work of turning towards, of feeling the affective weight of resisting or complying 
with the normative pressures of settlement and dealing with disorientation.  
My focus on the affective dimensions of performing settlement – the feeling that 
settler bodies experience when turning away – is mainly inspired by the work of three 
scholars who write in the tradition of affect theory. The first is Brian Massumi’s ideas on 
 
22 Ahmed, Living, 12. 
23 Berlant, “Thinking,” 5 in Ahmed, Living,13.  
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the political ontology of threat, which sees threat as “from the future” and as what brings 
ever looming uncertainty. As he describes, “The threat will have been real for all of eternity. 
It will have been real because it was felt to be real. Whether the danger was existent or not, 
the menace was felt in the form of fear. What is not actually real can be felt into being. 
Threat does have an actual mode of existence: fear, as foreshadowing. Threat has an 
impending reality in the present. This actual reality is affective.”24 I find in Massumi’s 
reading of threat the realness that settlers feel when they are coerced by affective pressures 
to maintain settlement.  
The second is Lauren Berlant and her thoughts on “cruel optimism,” which she 
explains “names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose 
realization is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible and 
toxic…Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic 
object in advance of its loss.”25 In coordination with Massumi’s ideas on threat, I find in 
Berlant’s cruel optimism the affective implications of “settler fantasies of entitlement,” 
which Eva Mackey defines as a logic that is a “socially embedded, unconscious 
expectation[s] of how the world will work.”26 According to Mackey, the fantasy of 
settlement requires constant maintenance to make real the unnatural presence of settlers 
and thus always carries a threat to certainty. Settlement, as such, is a problematic object to 
which settlers remain attached even though it is a toxic fantasy to uphold.   
The third theorist who inspired my turn to engage with the affective dimensions of 
settlement is Sara Ahmed. Ahmed’s work on “happy objects” positions family as a happy 
object that identifies “those who do not reproduce its line as the cause of unhappiness.”27 
Following through one’s family lineage in this respect is premised on the promise of 
happiness. This speaks to the promise of success that settlers are offered if they continue 
along the lines of settlement and the ways they are coerced to maintain the lineage of 
 
24 Massumi, 54. 
25 Berlant, “Cruel,” 94. 
26 Mackey, Unsettled, 132. 
27 Ahmed, “Happy,” 30. 
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settlement for fear of feeling they are the cause of unhappiness for other settlers. These 
three theorists collectively have brought me to consider the affective implications of 
turning away and towards the promised happiness of settlement, the threat of uncertainty 
regarding settler futurity, and what this means for becoming an interruption that is a 
different kind of problem than the settler problem. 
My perception of the settler problem, as it was presented to me during the Oka 
crisis, was managed relationally to a line of orientation that felt familiar. To unpack this 
statement, I look to Sara Ahmed’s books, Queer Orientations and Living a Feminist Life. 
In her discussions on “Lines That Direct Us,” she argues that societal norms allow us to 
share a direction, a future point in time that we take up to share and connect with others. 
Norms dictate our directions by informing our aspirations and future goals. Norms coerce 
us to follow certain directions and not others to ensure our happiness and success. Norms 
provide a source of stress, a “social pressure to follow a certain course, to live a certain 
life, and even to reproduce that life can feel like a physical “press” on the surface of the 
body.”28 Norms are therefore directive along a path that is well-trodden, that has been 
produced by those who came before us. As Ahmed describes, “The lines that direct us, as 
lines of thought as well as lines of motion, are in this way performative: they depend on 
the repetition of norms and conventions, of routes and paths taken, but they are also created 
as an effect of this repetition.”29 We make that path available to those who come after us 
by walking it and keeping it well worn.  
At the age of fourteen, nodding and shrugging in repetition was my way of going 
along to get along. I was directed by a set of norms that allowed my life to be undisturbed 
provided I gave myself over to the momentum and let the stream take me. To be clear, 
giving myself over did not simply require my intellectual complicity with the positions of 
the developers or the settler state. Giving myself over meant my body had to take up space 
in situations moving in one way rather than another. So, I took up space by making myself 
 
28 Ahmed, Queer, 17. 
29 Ahmed, Queer, 16. 
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small, nodding and shrugging and generally being amendable to other people’s angry 
flailing hands or wise nods of knowing and reassurance.  
At the time, my strategy for going along to get along felt harmless because I was 
doing nothing that was offensive, or so I thought. I understood my conduct to be a way of 
remaining neutral by not interrupting the flow that I understood everyone around me to be 
invested in. My comprehension of neutrality emerged in accordance with the liberal 
discourses of the time, which touted the stance that everyone was equal. The liberal value 
of equality that underpins universal representation in social and political liberal Canada 
assumes “a nonhierarchically ordered, “difference-­blind” form of universal 
enfranchisement,” which obscures the colonial histories on which the current state of 
inequity rests.30 My claim to neutrality was therefore, a denial that I was living as a 
beneficiary in the program of settlement. However, claiming neutrality appeared to be a 
suitable solution that did not disrupt the current of the stream. 
 I did not want the bother of hesitation, of asking questions and of being the 
problem. The problem, as far as I could perceive, was that Indigenous peoples were 
resisting what was inevitable; in which case, the settler problem appeared to me to be the 
problem that Indigenous peoples were to settlers. In this definition of the settler problem, 
Indigenous peoples become a problem that settlers are tasked with managing into the 
current of the stream. This rendition echoes the historical beginnings of colonization in 
North America, wherein government programs sought to integrate Indigenous groups into 
the format of settlement. As Sarah Carter describes,  
The government undertook to protect, care for, and guide the Indians during the 
difficult period of transition from “savagery to civilization.” It pursued a deliberate 
course of placing Indians upon reserves, developing an interest in labor among 
them, and attaching them to agriculture in order to teach them the white man’s 
means of support. As well, instruction in agriculture would prepare them for a 
“higher civilization” and encourage them “to assume the privileges and 
responsibilities of full citizenship.”31 
 
30 Nichols, “Contract,” 108. 
31 Stanley, 5, in Carter, 4. 
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Incorporating Indigenous bodies into the economic system of settlement was thus a way of 
bringing them into the stream of “civilization,” or more pointedly, culturally assimilating 
them under the assumption that their cultures were somehow deficient. I was also 
inhabiting this stream, and for me, it was not such a terrible place to be. I could not 
understand why they should bother being so bothersome as to put their own bodies at risk 
because I did not understand how bothered they were. Settlement in Canada appeared 
inevitable to me, and so it followed that Indigenous folk should not be so bothered about 
it. Or even worse that they should stop interrupting, stop potentially making their situation 
worse and just go with it. 
  The way that I interpreted Indigenous resistance was informed by the norms of 
settler society. The stream that was comfortable for me was not comfortable for them, but 
norms imply a direction that is shared, and I was certain they shared in the security the 
stream provided. The protestors were bothering settlers because they also were bothered 
by the settler problem, which appears to them as the problem settlers and their settlement 
are to Indigenous peoples. In this definition of the settler problem, Indigenous peoples are 
tasked with resisting settlers and their incessant desire to acquire lands at any cost. In her 
discussions on the enduring necessity of resistance, Nishnaabeg writer, musician, and 
academic Leanne Betasamosake Simpson explains, 
They [Simpson’s children] also expect that we will be there [on the land] anyway, 
in spite of environmental destruction, despite the violence of surveillance culture, 
because they were born into a centuries-old legacy of resistance, persistence, and 
profound love that ties our struggle to other Indigenous peoples in the Americas 
and throughout the world. It is not happenstance or luck that Indigenous peoples 
and our lands still exist after centuries of attack. This is our strategic brilliance. Our 
presence is our weapon, and this is visible to me at every protest, every 
mobilization, every time a Two Spirit person gifts us with a dance at our powwows, 
every time we speak our truths, every time we embody Indigenous life.32 
Simpson’s description articulates the ongoing struggle against the imposition of settlement 
and how it has become a multigenerational project to defend and protect Indigenous 
individuals, cultures, and nations from settlement. The ways that settlement seeks to 
 
32 Simpson, Always Done, 6. 
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destroy Aboriginal Nations and harm individuals for the sake of lands has always 
positioned Indigenous peoples to have to resist.  
Bringing Simpson’s insights to my recollection of the Oka crisis speaks to the 
insularity of the settler perspective concerning the settler problem. Indigenous resistance 
can often appear to settlers as demands for special treatment instead of struggles to be 
recognized as sovereign partners. This misrecognition is largely due to Canada’s liberal 
multicultural ethos. As Andrew Woolford explains, “The essentialized identity of the First 
Nation ‘other,’…presents itself to the liberal mindset of the ordinary citizen as a 
relationship of special treatment whereby one group, based upon their ethnic identity, 
receives privileges that contradict excepted discourses of equal rights and 
responsibilities.”33 The discourses of equality and inclusion that substantiate 
multiculturalism are not inclusive of the complex histories of land relations and treaties. 
Just as this exclusion of historical lineage allows the settler to claim neutrality, it also 
constructs a perception of Indigenous resistance as unsubstantiated and their demands as 
unreasonable. 
Further to this, implying there has been a clean break between historical colonialism 
and present – more equal – circumstances obscures the fact that colonialism continues to 
subject settlers’ sovereign partners. The rhetoric of reconciliation, as it is positioned 
alongside national discourses of multiculturalism, apology, and liberal ideals is bound up 
with presenting this clean break, with purpose. In his discussion concerning the settler 
states’ focus on reconciliation, David Garneau has stated,  
Re-conciliation refers to the repair of a previously existing harmonious 
relationship. This word choice imposes the fiction that equanimity is the status quo 
between Aboriginal people and Canada. Initial conciliation was tragically disrupted 
and will be painfully restored through the current process. In this context, the 
imaginary the word describes is limited to post-contact narratives. This 
construction anaesthetizes knowledge of the existence of pre-contact Aboriginal 
sovereignty. It narrates halcyon moments of co-operation before things went wrong 
as the seamless source of harmonious origin. And it sees the residential school era, 
for example, as an unfortunate deviation rather than just one aspect of the perpetual 
 
33 Woolford, 137.  
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colonial struggle to contain and control Aboriginal people, territories, and 
resources.34 
Programs of reconciliation, as Garneau describes them, are useful for state apologies that 
focus on residential schools as the source of Indigenous oppression, as a way to avoid 
presenting settlement as a systemic arrangement. This, in turn, obscures the many 
components that comprise settlement and that continue to operate today – such as policing 
and surveilling, the state’s neglect in upholding their responsibilities for proper funding to 
First Nations schooling and healthcare, and most notably, illegal acquisition of lands.35 
In her book My Conversations with Canadians, Sto:lo poet and author Lee Maracle 
recalls being asked what reconciliation means to her, directly after giving a talk on Missing 
and Murdered Indigenous Women. Her initial thoughts were to wonder if the man 
understood what reconciliation meant. As Maracle recalls,  
I could not believe he jumped to this conclusion without considering the killing was 
not over. Did he think we were friends before those men killed us? Did he think we 
liked them before they killed us? Did he think I was their friend when they killed 
those other women? “Well stop killing us would be a good place to begin,” I 
answered. The audience laughed. “Then maybe stop plundering our resources, stop 
robbing us of our children, end colonial domination – return our lands, and then we 
can talk about being friends. I can’t believe we are having this conversation after 
you listened to my presentation about the murder of Indigenous women and 
children. It is embarrassing – not for me, but for you.”36 
In addition to laying bare the fallacy of reconciliation, Maracle’s response illuminates the 
ways that settler perception misunderstands the lived realities of Indigenous peoples. More 
pointedly, Indigenous experiences of settlement that subjugate them often appear to settlers 
as unrelated to current systemic colonialism because, under the ethos of equality that sees 
colonial violence as a thing of the past, it is expected that everyone has equal opportunity 
to succeed. From this perspective, the imposition of violence and neglect that settlement 
 
34 Garneau, 35. 
35 Mackey, “Apology”; Talaga. See Mackey’s discussion to understand the functionality of focusing on residential 
schools in public apology and Talaga’s discussion on the systemic neglect that the state enacts towards upholding their 
responsibilities to Indigenous communities. 
36 Maracle, 137. 
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inflicts upon Indigenous peoples appears to be their own moral failings.37 Views that 
position Indigenous peoples as the settler problem are therefore blind to the systemic and 
ongoing character of settlement hidden behind national and social discourses that convey 
settler occupation as unrelated to Indigenous oppression and therefore, unproblematic.  
The common variable between the two definitions of the settler problem is 
settlement, or more specifically, settlers. Settlement is a structure that is bolstered by a set 
of norms, and it requires bodies to bring these norms into the material world. At the same 
time, settlement at present is an existing material structure that bodies move around in as 
they live settlement. It is a path that is perceivable to them because it is available; it is well-
trodden. Settlers become invested in the success of settlement because it is tied to their 
individual successes concerning their way of life. Taking up space as settlers along lines 
of orientation means traversing with others along the well-worn path. The work of 
traversing happens through various bodily actions such as placing one foot in front of the 
other to walk the path or by behaving in ways that are cooperative towards the collective 
exercise of traversing. The repetitiveness of traversing, of staying in line amongst others 
who stay in line, shapes bodies into bodies that are comfortable being in line. In this way, 
norms become bodily habits, “ways of acting and being in relation to others that have 
become second nature over time.”38  
I did not randomly invent the motions of nodding and shrugging; I learned this 
strategy from others who also felt they did not want to bother and by doing these actions 
in repetition I learned to habitually not bother. For settlers to dig a little deeper and ask 
questions is an interruption, it is to stop in a stream that is directing crowds of people and 
make themselves the source of “congestion.”39 The density of the crowd then feels hostile, 
less supportive than when you work with them along your mutual trajectory. But in being 
 
37 Dean, xxiv; Talaga 20/55/258. See Dean’s discussion on the intersectional need for understanding the conditions of 
disappearing Indigenous women, who have been largely represented in the media and treated by police and state 
authorities as if their own “poor choices” and “high risk lifestyles” were the culprit, with little consideration for the 
systemic arrangement of their choices and lived conditions. Also see Talaga’s arguments that police, settler community 
and administrative services do little to protect against nor take seriously violence against Indigenous youth because they 
are perceived to be “less than worthy victims.”  
38 Ahmed, Living, 45. 
39 Ahmed, Living, 45. I borrow the term “congestion” to describe stopping from Ahmed’s discussion on Traffic Systems. 
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the source of annoyance, in being an interruption, “you would then experience that flow as 
a tangible thing: what stops you from stopping; what slows you down.”40 If we do not 
pause, we remain unaware of what is coercing our movements. Stops come in the form of 
questions such as: why would the Kanien’kehaka people put their lives at risk if they have 
no claim to land? Why is everyone upset that I am asking them to explain this? Why do I 
care that they will be upset?  
To articulate these questions and their answers in language is to name a problem, 
which makes it exist outside of ourselves.41 To be clear, this is not an articulation of 
settlement that names Indigenous peoples as the settler problem; it is an articulation that 
would describe the feelings settlers feel when they are being coerced into becoming a 
problem. The purpose of articulations is not necessarily to find an intellectual answer to 
the problem; it is to place words to feelings and perceptions and describe in order to make 
tangible what keeps us from stopping.  
Thinking through lines of orientation is not only useful for understanding flow and 
interruption, but also the ways that one can cause a redirection. Going along to get along 
is what Ahmed might refer to as a turning away. To turn away is a learned behavior that is 
taught to us at a young age. To turn away from people who are homeless, for example, is 
“to screen out not only their suffering but their very existence. They are not anything to do 
with you.”42 Learning to turn away structures how we understand suffering, “whose 
suffering should affect us, or how we should be affected by those sufferings.”43 It also 
creates a distinction between who matters and who does not, who is a friend and who is a 
stranger.  
I perceived my strategy of nods and shrugs to be harmless because I felt I was doing 
nothing that was offensive. But to be clear, I was doing nothing offensive to the other 
settlers in my stream. My perception of what was offensive and what was not, complied 
 
40 Ahmed, Living, 45. 
41 Ahmed, Living, 34. 
42 Ahmed, Living, 32. 
43 Ahmed, Living, 32. 
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with the norms of my settler world. When I turned away from the task of grappling with 
and responding to Indigenous resistance, I was indeed being offensive by moving about as 
if their suffering did not matter. But if turning away is learned, then it is possible to learn 
to turn towards.44 If settlers refuse to turn away and instead turn towards what is difficult, 
new paths are created for those who come after us. 
Turning towards what is difficult so often appears to settlers as turning towards the 
problem that is Indigenous peoples because this is how they interpret the settler problem. 
Displacing the source of the problem onto their sovereign partners is how the narratives 
that support settlement stay intact. Programs of reconciliation and state apologies 
contribute to protecting these narratives by avoiding the dialogical process that is required 
to work with their partners. This is likely because Indigenous perspectives have the 
potential to undermine and re-arrange the settlement narratives. As Maracle describes, 
“Canada views itself as the nicest colonizer in the world. It does not ask the colonized if 
they agree with this, Canadians just keep repeating it to each other like bobbleheads that 
can’t stop bobbling. It doesn’t occur to them that this statement requires our agreement to 
be true.”45 Decolonization requires the work of listening and responding to settlement’s 
sovereign partners, of performing mindful and respectful coordination towards land 
relations. The paternalistic stance of the settler state that does not enact nor facilitate 
ongoing coordination creates the conditions in which settlers can retell the narratives of 
settlement as if they do not require validation from others.  
These stories and idealizations of the past and the present are not necessarily true 
but claim themselves to be by the settler who speaks and lives them as if settlement is a 
natural or justified occurrence. This is what Andrea Smith has referred to as “the logics of 
settler colonialism,” which Mark Rifkin defines as the “social, ideological, and institutional 
processes through which the authority of the settler state…is enacted.”46 The right to 
settlement operates as a socially embedded logic, and as such, it requires the constant 
 
44 Ahmed, Living, 32. See Ahmed’s discussion on turning towards, in which she looks to Audrey Lorde to understand 
how we can bear witness to our becoming by using words to describe what we have learned perceptually as children. 
45 Maracle, 133. 
46 Smith “White Supremacy,”; Rifkin, “States of Feeling.” 343. 
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performance of making colonial narratives real. Settlers take up these narratives as habitual 
norms while they traverse their lines of orientation. The ways that they interpret and attend 
to the settler problem is therefore habitually bound up in their body’s perceptual and motor 
faculties.  
Maintaining settlement for settlers is a move to uphold power and privilege. 
However, it is also a sensing project for settlers, which means that the project of 
decolonization must consider the affect of turning away to apprehend how settler bodies 
can bring themselves to turn towards. By emphasizing the role of feeling in this project, I 
am not suggesting that decolonization is possible if settlers were to feel differently. As 
Ahmed has described, histories of oppression come with good intentions and bad feelings; 
“they seem to bind together in a certain way, as if to say: by feeling bad I mean well.”47 
These expressions of guilt and apology may be authentically felt, but they do little to 
change inequitable land relations.48 The same is true about feelings of good intention, 
which excuse the privileged body that shrugs and nods because they do not intend to be 
offensive. The stream of colonization is always already in motion and it gathers its 
momentum and ability to direct with the weight and thickness of the bodies that traverse 
its lines; settlers do not need to intend the reproduction of settlement, they merely need to 
go with the flow.  
It is also not sufficient for individuals to think decolonization by being self-
reflexive. Self-reflexivity is a step but in itself cannot undermine the collective production 
of privilege and is not a substitution for action. As Andrea Smith argues, “the undoing of 
privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or trying to think themselves 
into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective structures that dismantle 
the systems that enable these privileges.”49 Smith’s ideas on what dismantling means are 
akin to Judy Vaughn’s stance, “You don’t think your way into a different way of acting; 
 
47 Ahmed, Living, 151. 
48 Gooder & Jacobs. See Gooder and Jacobs’ critique of political and civic forms of apology. 
49 Smith, “The Problem,” 264.   
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you act your way into a different way of thinking.”50 Settlement happens through actions 
taken by settler bodies, actions that are passive to the stream and simultaneously active in 
the stream. Decolonization will require settler bodies to take up the task with their bodies, 
with their actions in the material world. Turning towards is therefore not just a feeling, nor 
is it a thought, it is a physical movement to turn one’s body in the stream and forge a new 
path for others to follow. This thesis seeks to understand the affect involved in turning 
away and turning towards to discern how settlers can find resiliency when they feel 
uncertain so they can commit and follow through on the performances that are required to 
decolonize. 
To carry out the work of decolonization or teaching settlers how to be better is not 
something that Indigenous peoples should be tasked with. Settlers need to pick up their 
responsibility to treaty and regardfully coordinate with their sovereign partners. In order to 
establish these kinds of relationships, settlers will need to re-learn how to listen and respond 
to Indigenous presence and authority in respectful ways. This is to say that decisions 
regarding land relations – land use and the environmental implications of industry, taking 
portions of land away from reserves to give to industry, relocating Indigenous groups to 
land that is less-desirable, or impeding the growth of Indigenous-owned lands – need to be 
conducted in ways that are more equitably advantageous to settlement’s sovereign 
partners.51 However, as I have attempted to describe, the habitual perceptions and 
responses of settlers are informed by the norms of their settlement stream and they present 
obstacles for settlers’ understandings of how to be decolonizing in the world. This thesis 
takes up this problem by interrogating what I call the settler habit body, which is a body 
that pre-reflectively maintains settlement. But before I can thoroughly define this concept, 
it is necessary to turn towards a description of settlement in Canada and unpack the 
structure that settler bodies are bound up with. 
 
50 Judy Vaughn in Smith, “The Problem,” 264. 
51 Aamjiwnaang First Nation is one example of a community living on reserve land that has significantly decreased in 
size because of industry infringement. Those living in the community at present face health issues because they have 
become surrounded by 40% of Canada’s petrochemical refineries. The Caldwell First Nation’s purchase of farmland in 
Chatham-Kent, Ontario is an example wherein settlers attempted to impeded Indigenous acquisition of lands. I take up 
this example in chapter 2. 
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Describing Settlement 
Settlement in Canada is defined by a specific colonial model that requires the 
dispossession of Indigenous peoples from lands. Unlike other models of colonialism where 
imperial presence retreats back to their colonial metropoles, colonialism in countries such 
as Canada, the U.S., Australia and New Zealand are characterized by permanent settlement. 
These settlers take up residence with the intention of replacing Indigenous societies and 
maintain their own nation with administrative and legal bodies to sustain their dominion.52  
 
Prior to the inception of the Canadian state, the British Crown signed treaty 
agreements with Aboriginal nations to initiate positive economic and military relations. 
Since 1975, Canada has signed 25 modern treaties in addition to the 70 historical treaties 
carried over from the British Crown. These modern treaties, also known as comprehensive 
land claim agreements, are necessary to define lands where treaties were never signed. 
European rights to Canadian lands were born from treaties, which means that early 
generations of settlers who gained access to lands and resources through treaties became 
beneficiaries because Aboriginal nations shared with them.53 The historical foundations of 
European rights to lands are based upon shared responsibilities and rights to lands for both 
parties.54  
 
While these treaties between settlers and Indigenous peoples were signed and 
agreed upon, they have never been upheld to the standard of benefitting both parties. This 
is partly because the Crown and Aboriginal peoples do not define treaty the same way. As 
Mackey has discussed, 
For many Indigenous peoples, treaty was and is a sacred covenant made between 
sovereign nations in which they agree to ongoing relationships of respect, 
friendship, and peace, and thus recognition of the ongoing sovereignty and rights 
of Aboriginal nations…[However], Canada and many Canadians “regard treaties 
as an extinguishment of [Aboriginal] rights, and acceptance of the supremacy of 
 
52 Pasternak, 147. 
53 Royal Commission, 56. 
54 Royal Commission, 56. 
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the crown, and a generous gift of land to the Indians so they might have land of 
their own.”55  
 
Although Indigenous nations may regard treaty as the maintenance of relations that are 
equally sovereign, treaty for settlers and their state is understood to be a project of land 
acquisition and sole dominion. Treaty in the national settler imaginary has come to be 
synonymous with “Treaty Indians,”56 an association that delinks the settler nation from its 
responsibility to respectful partnership and represents Indigenous peoples as dependents 
upon the state’s benevolent governance. This illusion suppresses the role of treaty in the 
founding and legitimization of the state through which settlers are beneficiaries.57 The way 
that the settler imaginary interprets treaty is not a naïve nor an impartial phenomenon that 
reflects a simple misunderstanding between the two parties; it is a functioning component 
of colonialism that is required to support the state’s legal dominance over the sovereignties 
of Aboriginal nations.  
 
Recognition of Indigenous sovereignties, rights to land, and status rights have been 
perpetually under threat. The government has and continues to negotiate land claims 
reflecting the grievances of unfulfilled treaty promises to land and the loss of reserve land 
or band funds that were unlawfully taken. What is problematic about this process is the 
way that the legal system understands – or shows little regard for – the sovereignty of 
Aboriginal nations. Canadian law assumes its own legitimacy over Aboriginal Nations 
because the Canadian constitution is interpreted to mean that while Aboriginal peoples 
have an inherent right to self-governance, it has to be reconciled with Crown sovereignty.58 
“Reconcile” as it is used here, does not mean a meeting half-way for both parties, but 
instead suggests that “the legal sovereignty of the state always supersedes Aboriginal 
rights.”59 The underlying ideological assumption and legal attitude on which English 
colonialism in Canada rests is that their authority is always un-problematic and in being 
 
55 Royal Commission, 120 in Mackey, “Apology,” 52. 
56 Royal Commission, 120. 
57 Royal Commission, 120. 
58 Turner, “On the Idea,” 107. 
59 Mackey, “Apology,” 52. 
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so, it can claim centrality.60 The treaty agreements are therefore delegitimized by Canadian 
law, which does little to defend or respect their sovereign partners. 
 
Settler appropriation of land was not carried out solely by legal frameworks that 
sought to destabilize Indigenous treaty rights and eliminate status. To legitimize ongoing 
land appropriation, the destruction of Indigenous cultures was deemed necessary and the 
ability to do so required instilling in settlers “a sense of superiority and entitlement to 
legally define Indigenous cultures as inferior.”61 The legal system worked in conjunction 
with other national policies implemented to destroy Aboriginal cultures. These policies 
increased between the resource extraction of the late 1700s when Indigenous peoples were 
advantageous for the state’s resource economy and as military allies, and European 
settlement of the early 1800s when European settlers became concerned with acquiring 
land for agriculture and settlement.62 The interconnected efforts of cultural genocide and 
land appropriation worked “as a means to open space for the nation with the intent of 
containing and assimilating Aboriginal peoples.”63  
 
While political apologies in Canada have been given for programs of cultural 
genocide, it is widely discussed that land appropriation is not given mention as its 
inseparable correlate. As James Daschuk has argued, “Any serious consideration of 
Indigenous land tenure in western Canada must consider mortality from epidemic disease 
as a central determinant in the occupational history of the region.”64 Apologizing for 
cultural assimilation strategies, such as the “sixties scoop” and residential schools, thus 
becomes “a synecdoche for colonialism,”65 behind which the counterpart of land theft 
remains suppressed. As Jennifer Henderson has made clear, making apology of this type 
the most visible of Indigenous moves towards rightful reparations is advantageous for 
 
60 Asch, “Calder,” 110. 
61 Mackey, “Apology,” 51. 
62 Mackey, “Apology,” 50. 
63 Mackey, “Apology,” 51. 
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settlement because “from the point of view of the state – financial reparations for residential 
schooling can be individualized and contained in a way that land claims cannot.”66 Building 
upon Henderson’s insights, Mackey suggests that the residential schools as synecdoche 
approach “transforms the broader material colonial processes into something containable 
and…“apologizable,” precisely through vacating the pivotal role that land appropriation 
played in colonial processes.”67 De-associating residential schools from settlers’ 
illegitimate land appropriation obscures the fact that land theft and cultural genocide have 
always worked together to realize and maintain the contemporary nation-state.  
 
In 1991, the federal government formed the Royal Commission of Aboriginal 
Peoples (RCAP) to help address the obstacles plaguing the relationship between Aboriginal 
peoples (Inuit, Métis, and First Nations), the Canadian government, and Canadian society. 
This initiative was brought about in response to the 1990 “Oka crisis” in Quebec, when a 
land dispute between Kanien’kehaka people (the “Mohawk”) and the settler town of Oka, 
violently erupted.68 After years of examining the issues that confront Aboriginal peoples 
within the evolution of settler-Indigenous relations, the RCAP published its final report in 
1996. The report states that as a result of treaties, “Canadians have, over time, inherited the 
wealth generated by Aboriginal lands and resources...Thus...Canadians...can equally be 
considered participants in the treaty process ... as the contemporary beneficiaries of the 
treaties.”69 The RCAP’s stance is that we are all treaty peoples – inclusive of the state and 
Canadians – and as such, “the terms of the treaties define the rights and responsibilities of 
both parties.”70 It is, therefore, the responsibility of settlers to maintain proper treaty 
relations, yet the incentive to do so is at odds with the national culture, which understands 
treaty to be a gift from the state to Aboriginal nations. 
 
 
66 Henderson, 67. 
67 Mackey, “Apology,” 50. 
68 See Wakeham’s discussion on the excessive force of the state and their use of terrorism rhetoric to manage Indigenous 
resistance.  
69 Royal Commission, 120. 
70 Royal Commission, 120. 
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To summarize, settlement in Canada is a permanent colonial settlement founded on 
treaty agreements. These treaties initiated sovereign partnerships between the historic 
Crown of Canada and Aboriginal nations, and have been carried over into the 
contemporary state and joined by modern treaties. Recent evaluations by the RCAP on the 
evolution of Indigenous-settler relations has shown that treaty relations have not been 
responsibly upheld, which is why settler Canadians are the contemporary beneficiaries. 
These inequitable results have emerged by way of national policies that sought to influence 
national settler culture and instill in settlers a sense of superiority. As discussed, Canadian 
law assumes its legitimacy over Indigenous peoples, making it appear as if Aboriginal 
nations require the jurisdiction of Crown sovereignty. To garner this legal dominance, the 
state needed to define Indigenous peoples as inferior in the settler imaginary because it has 
no legal grounds for its dominion. National policies of cultural genocide and assimilation 
were thus instated to destabilize Aboriginal nations for the purposes of delegitimizing 
Indigenous sovereignties. Formal apologies made by the government forefront cultural 
assimilation programs as a synecdoche for colonialism, which obscures the core reason 
these programs were instituted: to legitimize land appropriation.  
Describing Settlerness  
The national settler culture in Canada is shaped by the state’s colonizing program. 
While the RCAP urges settlers to actively take up the task of decolonizing relations, the 
incentive to perform responsible treaty relations is at odds with how the settler understands 
their role in Canadian society. The colonial legacy reflects an understanding of settlement 
as sole dominion and not partnerships, as illustrated by the discrepancy in treaty definitions 
between the state and Aboriginal nations and enforced by Canadian law. Based upon what 
has been presented to settlers through the national narratives, they understand themselves 
to be the rightful owners of their property with no expectation that they should consider 
nor respect the treaties that bind them in partnership to Aboriginal peoples. As I have 
discussed, this is partly because the settler imaginary sees Indigenous peoples in ways that 
redefine and thus reallocate the settler problem away from themselves. This, in turn, 
relieves the settler of immediate responsibility to upholding proper treaty relations because 
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it places the blame on historical events and peoples or on the perceived moral inferiority 
of their sovereign partners.  
 
While the hegemonic structure in Canada seeks to accommodate pluralism, the laws 
and regulating systems ascribe to a liberal white framework for understanding the 
boundaries of freedom and nation-building.71 Settlers who are normative within this 
hegemonic structure are defined by their whiteness, British heritage and being a descendant 
of multigenerational settlement that formed the contemporary state of Canada.72 While 
newer Canadian immigrants may not fit this normative profile, they are absorbed into the 
structure of the settler nation through ideologies such as multiculturalism in Canada.73 
While there are many forms of multiculturalism, Canada’s brand, in particular, is one if 
liberal culturalism, which “value[s] the sanctity of individual autonomy” under one nation 
and claims itself to be a model for equality.74 Each individual who lives this autonomy is 
responsible for their own successes and failures because liberal frameworks deny the 
presence of systemic prejudice and oppression. This absorbs new Canadians into the labor 
force under the ideological presupposition that their hard work will determine their success 
within the structure of settlement. This is how settlers become involved in the Canadian 
economy, which is built from and continues to rely on land. 
 
Settler bodies can be intersectionally marked, or they may carry a normative profile, 
and they may also take up a variety of economic and socioeconomic positionalities. What 
differentiates settlers from Indigenous peoples in settler society is that they do not have 
treaty rights and therefore are not a threat to the state’s sole dominion. This means that the 
types of systemic oppression that settlers experience have different historical bases, 
 
71 Mackey, House, 159. See Eva Mackey’s discussion regarding the logic of ‘Canada First,’ whereby liberal whiteness is 
referred to in challenging times as the unmarked core of western culture under the assumption that it is the most rational 
way to peacefully function.  
72 Berger, 147. See Berger’s assessment on how French whiteness was employed to demonstrate Canada’s proclivity 
towards tolerance, a trait inherited from the British Empire, which was used to differentiate Canada from the U.S. 
Whiteness in Canada is therefore aligned with being British and not inclusively western European. 
73 Mackey, House, 68. See Eva Mackey’s discussion concerning multiculturalism as ‘the great national bandage” that 
“allows the state to highlight and manage diversity without endangering the project of nation-building.” 
74 Murphy, 63. 
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trajectories, and affiliated narratives to substantiate unjust treatment than those inflicted 
upon Indigenous peoples. While the government seeks to manage marked settler bodies, it 
does so with the incentive of growing the labor force by collecting and integrating bodies 
into the economy. In contrast, Indigenous bodies are designated for destruction because the 
state has always sought to suppress their right to sovereign partnership. All settlers – 
normative or not – are beneficiaries of inequitable treaty relations either because they are 
descendants of early settlers or they become bound up in Canada’s social practices and 
economy. In any case, colonialism works through the everyday performances of settler 
bodies, which carry forward the colonial legacy. Settlers are therefore privileged in 
Canadian society because their bodies and lives are valuable for enabling settlement. 
Chapter Summaries 
In chapter one of this thesis, I discuss the concept of the habit body to provide 
pertinent theoretical grounding for situating the settler habit body in subsequent chapters. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to re-present settler colonialism as an embodied habitual 
practice that is malleable to change. However, any discussions concerning change must 
begin with articulating the frame of habit construction within the body, more generally. I 
begin with a close reading of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and proceed 
further using critical phenomenology theorists for a more nuanced placement of bodily 
habits in societal context. My argument in chapter one maintains that viewing privileged 
bodies as habitually maintaining the status quo by actively holding habits brings to them 
the responsibility of examining their perceptual frameworks.  
 
In chapter two, I utilize the lens of the habit body to contemplate the efficacy of 
settler bodies for performing decolonization. Working closely with Eva Mackey’s 
ethnographic research on settler-Indigenous relations, I forefront the “sweaty” work of 
living and confronting settlement, as a settler. Bringing in terms from phenomenology, 
metaphysics, and affect theory, I read and interrogate settlerness. I claim that the structure 
of settlement is habitual in the settler body and is apparent in the ways they sense the world. 
I argue that a practise of resiliency to the affective implications of decolonization is 
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necessary. My aim in chapter two is to flesh out the shift from the theoretical work of 
habituation with the embodied perspective of settlerness in Canada.   
The final chapter of this thesis is concerned with taking up the problematic question 
of how settlers can open their habitual faculties to form more equitable land relations. 
Looking to critical phenomenologists, I explicate how settler habitual faculties can be 
reshaped affectively. I draw from settler-colonial scholars and Indigenous thinkers, leaders 
and scholars to discuss the compatibility of Indigenous philosophies of treaty – Guswentha 
– with phenomenological approaches – “seeing with.” My discussion in part one of this 
chapter picks up and investigates Eva Mackey’s question, “how can we listen to others 
when we already know?”75 My discussion in part two aims to take this investigation from 
understanding how settlers can do differently into the more concerning question of why 
settlers would take up the task of decolonizing work. I conclude by arguing that habits 
determine our expectations for the future, and as such, incremental changes in habits bring 
different expectations for our futures into view. If settler bodies begin the sweaty work of 
decolonization, they become open to new possibilities for understanding themselves in the 
world. In which case, how the settler does differently changes why they would want to be 
different.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 Mackey, Unsettled, 132. 
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Chapter One: The Habit Body in the World 
Introduction   
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s structure of the habit body emerged within his body of 
work as a way to understand systems of relations between humans and their world. One of 
his most important contributions to the field of phenomenology was description as a formal 
methodology for reflecting on embodied human existence. To be able to articulate our pre-
reflective experience is to get close to the “present and living reality” of our perception, 
which is useful for studying human relations as well as their relationships to language 
culture and society.76 Our bodies are always approaching the world through our habits, 
which frame how we perceive the encounter. To describe these encounters is, therefore, to 
reveal, as I describe below, what is invisible in the moment of perception. To describe the 
burning our squinting eyes feel when it is too bright is to make apparent that there is not 
enough shade. 
Merleau-Ponty’s return to the primacy of perception brought focus to the perception 
of our presence in the world. Given his involvement with political commentary and 
analysis, he did not see his theoretical work as disconnected from his political engagement 
and in fact believed philosophy needed to become more real-world engaged.77 As Moran 
describes, “In political terms, Merleau-Ponty saw his mission as reconciling dialectical 
materialism with freedom.”78 I read Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on the habit body to be a 
political project of the body, a body that describes its experience of the world against the 
universalizing narratives that might tell them otherwise. To describe the sensations of being 
a settler in Canada makes the pressures of norms apparent against the promise of happiness 
that orients us towards our common goal. To describe the feeling of entitlement is to reveal 
the ways that settler consciousness has been shaped by the conditions of settlement. In The 
Primacy of Perception, Merleau-Ponty explains,   
 
76 Merleau-Ponty, Primacy, 25. 
77 Moran, 397. 
78 Moran, 397. 
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By these words, “the primacy of perception”, we mean that the experience of 
perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values, are constituted 
for us; that perception is a nascent logos; that it teaches us, outside all dogmatism, 
the true conditions of objectivity itself; that it summons us to the tasks of knowledge 
and action. It is not a question of reducing human knowledge to sensation, but of 
assisting at the birth of this knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible, to 
recover the consciousness of rationality. This experience of rationality is lost when 
we take it for granted as self-evident, but is, on the contrary, rediscovered when it 
is made to appear against the background of non-human nature.79   
The true conditions of objectivity as we sense them come to us through our faculties of 
habitual perception, which I will explain below as a structured way of seeing the world. 
Our perception, before we apply reason or rationalize it is our sense of our conditions. 
Perception and reason together constitute our reflexive reasoning and our pre-reflective 
habit. How we perceive is thus not impartial to the social and political milieu that we 
inhabit. Our pre-reflective experience is where we feel settlement before we can rationalize 
it, but we are feeling settlement none the less, and settlement is a political structure.  
This chapter deliberates on the habit body to provide pertinent theoretical 
grounding for situating the settler habit body in subsequent chapters. The overall aim of 
this thesis is to re-present settler colonialism as an embodied habitual practice that is 
malleable to change. However, any discussions concerning change must begin with 
articulating the frame of habit construction within the body, more generally. To accomplish 
this, I build upon a close reading of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work in Phenomenology of 
Perception, to discuss the habit body as a correlative structure to the external world. I bring 
this lens in particular to settler bodies because it complicates propositions for 
decolonization that place importance on the onto-epistemological stance of the settler. Such 
approaches suggest that decolonization requires the settler to “think” outside settlement or 
be open to intellectualizing their settlement practices differently. But as I will describe in 
this chapter, the ways our bodies interact with the world are not separate from what we 
think or how we know ourselves. In which case, it is not an efficacious strategy for settlers 
 
79 Merleau-Ponty, Primacy, 25. 
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to think their way to becoming decolonizing; they must know themselves as decolonizing 
in the world.  
Bodies carry pre-reflective knowledge that assists their navigation in the world. 
This means that our bodies find their way around the world without explicit instruction 
from conscious thought. What we think and how we know the world with our bodies is not 
a mind over matter procedure, but a nuanced production that inextricably links our 
understanding of ourselves and the world with our body’s exploration of it. With every 
movement our bodies make, their intellect, consciousness, and corporeal being are 
intertwined and co-constitutive.80 The body is a subject-object because it is a material body 
with a consciousness that is conditioned by the world, as it conditions it. This chapter 
discusses the integral components of the habit body and its character to provide a basis for 
further chapters that problematize the habitual faculties of settlers.  
The first section of this chapter unpacks the main terms and operations of the habit 
body. Bodily intentionality and consciousness are discussed as faculties emergent from the 
body’s interactions with the exterior world. Bodily intentionality is a complex system that 
does not merely respond to intellectual instruction but responds to the world using pre-
reflective perceptual engagement. Over time, the body’s perceptual faculties and its 
responses to the world become habitual. 
 The second section of this chapter discusses the role of culturally instituted 
practices and how they come to be embedded in the habitual perceptions and bodily 
responses of bodies. The perceptive faculties of the body learn from and thus reflect the 
hegemonic order of the larger cultural milieu. This teaches our bodies how to see, it over-
determines what we see, and it defines the relationships we form to other figures. These 
relations thus reflect the larger hierarchies of the cultural milieu and therefore influence 
 
80 While my language in this chapter may at times focus on one of intellect, consciousness, or the body, it should be taken 
as my effort to discuss those qualities that have been differentiated by other theoretical lenses common to Western 
philosophical understanding, but that cannot truly be separated out from the inextricable structure of the body as far as 
critical phenomenology is concerned.  
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how the normative body performs its privilege relationally to marked bodies. Through 
repetition, this mode of conduct becomes habitual for privileged bodies.    
 The final section of this chapter contemplates the distinction between sedimentation 
and habit for the purposes of understanding how privileged bodies can take responsibility 
for their bodily habits. While sedimentation is the body’s index of acquired skills – how to 
lift objects and walk around them – habit is the process that discerns which skills will be 
utilized and which will not. To maintain habits that are oppressive is thus not a passive 
existence, but an active way of being in the world. To focus on habit and not sedimentation 
facilitates an approach to changing habit bodies that perform and thus maintain systems of 
oppression.  
Overall, my argument maintains that although habits of perception and response 
are un-conscious, they become habitual behavior that can be consciously analyzed. To view 
privileged bodies as habitually maintaining the status quo by actively holding habits brings 
to them the responsibility of examining their perceptual frameworks. As each body is 
unique in its relation to the hegemonic order, the task of un-monumentalizing privileged 
bodies will be as unique to each body as the intersections of milieu that teach its habitual 
perception and response.   
The Body in the World 
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty discusses the body as a complex 
perceptual system inextricably linked with consciousness and the world. He argues that 
“The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and for a living being, having a body means 
being united with a definite milieu, merging with certain projects, and being perpetually 
engaged therein.”81 The projects that our bodies take up pertain to our consciousness, as 
“consciousness itself is a project of the world.”82 When we intend towards objects with our 
 
81 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 84.  
82 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, xxxii. 
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desires, we find ourselves in our practical and perceptual involvements with things.83 These 
projects are not conducted by the thought of a movement nor the movement itself, nor are 
they tandem operations from thought to movement or vice versa; they are movement and 
consciousness of movement that give us “moments of a single whole.”84 But our 
movements in the world are not just for ourselves, as they are situated in the milieu of our 
world and, as such, they are affected by social, cultural, political, and historical forces that 
comprise that milieu.  
 My body stands in the world as an object and simultaneously as a subject. The 
relationship between my body as an object and as a subject is not one of complete 
differentiation, as “all consciousness is consciousness of something.”85 My consciousness 
understands my body as being a physical presence that is part of my external world. How 
I know and understand myself is dependent upon how I learn myself in relation to the 
objects I encounter outside myself and what they mean to me. This body is at once sensing 
and sensible, and it is what Merleau-Ponty refers to as “the phenomenal body.” The 
meanings I make when I encounter objects in the world do not ascribe to an explanation of 
linear causation, whereby my interactions align with a universal meaning. I make meanings 
of my perceptual encounters at the intersections of my bodily intentions and the milieu I 
live amongst, and these intersections produce the context that is my own personal 
worldview. The perceptual interactions that my body has with objects and other people are 
therefore a self-organizing process in which my consciousness is shaped. 
 Since our conscious understanding is always a perceiving engagement with the 
world, our bodies are directed towards objects and people to fulfil our thoughts, beliefs, 
and desires. This intentionality is not solely a product that involves intellectual thought as 
 
83 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 84. “This is the paradox of all being in the world, By carrying myself towards a 
world, I throw my perceptual intentions and my practical intentions against objects that appear to me, in the end, as 
anterior and exterior to these intensions, and which nevertheless exist for me only insofar as they arouse thoughts and 
desires in me.” 
84 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 113. “Sometimes the patient thinks of the ideal formula of the movement, other times 
he throws his body into blind attempts; however, for the normal person every movement is indissolvably movement and 
consciousness of movement. This can be expressed by saying that, for the normal person, every movement has a 
background, and that the movements and its background are “moments of a single whole.” 
85 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 5. 
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a separate function and master over the motility of the body; although it is sometimes the 
case that my body will say “don’t forget your keys” and then walk towards the key bowl. 
Husserl’s distinction between “act intentionality” and “operative intentionality” is 
significant here for understanding the body as having its own system of thought and action 
inextricably linked to objective thought and the world.86 Act intentionality is “the 
intentionality of our judgements and our voluntary decisions,” which are decided upon in 
conscious thought much like the explicit instructions I give myself to procure my keys.87 
Operative intentionality is the intentionality that appears in our desires and evaluations that 
we must then articulate in language.  
Operative intentionality is pre-reflective, meaning it is a bodily intention that 
happens before we can consciously reflect on it. It is instances like these where we find 
ourselves unable to remember if we accomplished certain tasks, such as grabbing our keys 
on the way to work, until we consciously confirm it by finding our keys in our pocket. 
These experiences happen at the level of bodily perception and utilize our body’s own 
awareness of ourselves in the world. 88 This means I may tell myself not to forget my keys, 
but I do not have to tell my body how to grasp the keys and walk to the front door. While 
moving about in the world at times might be an intellectual endeavor, it is intricately fused 
to a perceptive performance. To understand the external world requires the body “to grasp 
the total intention” and not just the properties, narratives, and ideas that can be 
intellectualized.89 Objects carry properties that give them a unique manner of existing 
because they provide experiential knowledge. In other words, if I consciously remind 
myself to intend towards my keys, my body models my grasp to anticipate my hand’s 
encounter with their lightness and serrated edges so as not to drop them or cut myself, 
without an objective thought to do so. To know my keys is therefore not only to know them 
in thought but know them in my hand. Husserl’s operative intentionality is more akin to 
 
86 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, xxxii.  
87 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, xxxii. 
88 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, xxxii. 
89 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, xxxii. “Whether it is a question of a perceive thing, an historical event, or a doctrine, 
‘to understand’ is to grasp the total intention – not merely what these things are for representation, namely, the ‘properties’ 
of the perceived thing, the myriad of ‘historical events,’ and the ideas introduced by the doctrine.” 
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Merleau-Ponty’s conception of bodily intentionality, which does more than serve 
intellectual thought. 
 Bodily intentionality is my body being in the world, responding to tasks with 
perceptive engagement. Perceptive encounters are the body’s first encounters in the world, 
being that they precede a child’s induction into frames of understanding provided by the 
language they acquire to explain their experiences.90 The child’s first world is the sensible 
world, in which “he understands well beyond what he knows how to say, responds well 
beyond what he could define.”91 Open to the world by way of their senses, the child is 
unrestricted by the linearity of language that is insufficient for communicating the multi-
dimensional character of lived experience. The moments we live in the world are moments 
in which our histories and our hopes and desires for the future all come to inform our 
perception of the present encounter. Language structures how we communicate our 
perception of experiences as a relating communal endeavor; therefore, the use of language 
translates the dynamic personal experience of the individual into a fixed interpretation for 
the purpose of mutual understanding.92 However, language and perception are also not 
completely differentiated but are intertwined structures of meaning-making that give us 
different ways of grasping our circumstances. Our experience may not be reducible to 
language, but language lends itself to our ability to make sense of the world. Our experience 
has an original meaning and a related system of intentionality which allows the body to 
understand its world outside of linguistic representations or being subordinated to a 
“symbolic” or “objectifying” function.93 Bodily intentionality is this primary perceptive 
system, or “practical directedness towards the world” through bodily consciousness. It is 
 
90 Merleau-Ponty, Visible/ Invisible, 11.  
91 Merleau-Ponty, Visible/Invisible, 13. 
92 Moran, 405. Moran argues that “Merleau-Ponty sees the tendency towards disregarding historicality and temporality 
as in part due to the manner in which thought comes to expression in a language. The congealing of temporal thinking 
into language and concepts acts to fix meanings, to give the appearance of absoluteness. Furthermore, through language 
and signs the constituted human social world is brought about, and constitutes a ‘system.” 
93 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 141. “The motor experience of our body is not a particular case of knowledge; rather, 
it offers us a manner of reaching the world and the object, a “praktognosia,” that must be recognized as original, and 
perhaps as originary. My body has its world, or understands its world without having to go through “representations,” or 
without being subordinated to a “symbolic” or “objectifying” function. 
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therefore important for understanding the intending body as a more complex system than 
merely an expression of intellectual mastery over the body’s motility.94 
 When my body encounters an object, my perception of it relies upon its spatial 
arrangement to other objects.  As I locate my keys on the dresser’s surface, I narrow my 
view to bring the keys into focus, which sends the other objects around it into the 
background. The object of my intention is the keys and the objects surrounding it create 
the horizon against which I can focus my intent. To bring my focus to the smaller details 
in the keys, to pick them up and turn them around in my hand as I inspect them, requires 
that I focus on some of the details while others recede. Through this object-horizon 
structure of perceiving, I “suspend the surroundings in order to see the object better, and to 
lose in the background what is gained in the figure.”95 My awareness of the dresser is 
therefore imperative to my view of the keys because in not being the keys, the dresser 
becomes the background against which the keys appear to me.  
My perception of objects is learned and indexed over the course of different 
experiences with them. My bodily movements that I use to maneuver objects with my 
hands is always a perceptual exploration through which I create a bodily and conscious 
memory of their many sides, textures, and weights. As Merleau-Ponty describes:  
Each moment in time gives itself as a witness to all others. It shows, by taking 
place, “how this was bound to happen” and “how it will have ended.” Each present 
definitively establishes a point that solicits the recognition of all others. Thus, the 
object is seen from all times just as it is seen from all places, and by the same means, 
namely, the horizon structure. The present still holds in hand the immediate past, 
but without positing it as an object, and since this immediate past likewise retains 
the past that immediately preceded it, time gone by is entirely taken up and grasped 
in the present.96 
 
94 McWeeny, 259. 
95 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 70. “Even if I knew nothing of cones and rods, I would still understand that it is 
necessary to suspend the surroundings in order to see the object better, and to lose in the background what is gained in 
the figure, because to see the object is to plunge into it and because objects form a system in which one object cannot 
appear without concealing others.”   
96 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 71. 
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In the present, my memories allow me to understand objects as having different angles 
even as my body stands to face or touch only one side of them.  Looking down upon the 
keys on the dresser, I am aware that what I see of them in that moment is not the only 
perception of the keys that can be had. Although I may look at the keys, my view of them 
overlaps with my other sense memories to know the keys as carrying potential; I know 
these keys to be an extension of my body and not a one-dimensional picture.  
Being that my perception is an accumulation of learned experiences, my bodily 
intentions have both a spatial and temporal horizon. Although object encounters happen in 
a distinct moment in time, those moments draw upon my past perceptual experiences. The 
moment that I encounter the object, it is “seen from all times just as it is seen from all 
places, and by the same means, namely, the horizon structure.”97 Just as the spatial horizon 
facilitates my perception of an object through relief, the temporal horizon structure is 
necessary for me to have a present that is immanent to yet differentiated from moments in 
history and the flow of duration into the future.98 This distinct moment in time is where 
my body gains consciousness. Merleau-Ponty argues that “the present (taken broadly, with 
its originary horizons of past and future) has, nevertheless, a privileged status because it is 
the zone in which being and consciousness coincide.”99 The present is where “ultimate 
consciousness” can be found because it is where “my being and consciousness are one.” It 
is also where “We indubitably communicate with ourselves by communicating with the 
world. We hold time in its entirety and we are present to ourselves because we are present 
in and towards the world.”100 The horizons that surround us help us establish our immediate 
“field of presence”: a situation or a point in time that references other points in time and 
that will become a point of reference for future points in time. To be conscious, then is to 
 
97 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 71. 
98 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 72. “Along with the immanent future, I also have the horizon of the past that will 
surround it; that is, I have my actual present as the past of that future. Thus, thanks to the double horizon of retention and 
protention, my present can cease to be a present that is in fact about to be carried off and destroyed by the flow of duration 
and can rather become a fixed and identifiable point in an objective time.”  
99 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 447. 
100 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 448. 
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be perceptually experiencing in a moment. In which case, we are always intending towards 
the world to know ourselves. 
In addition to helping us establish our presence, our horizons determine the quality 
of that presence and ultimately our consciousness. According to Merleau-Ponty, our 
intending bodies perceive the world in accordance with a multitude of horizons that 
comprise the particulars of our individual situation:  
The life of consciousness – epistemic life, the life of desire, or perceptual life – is 
underpinned by an “intentional arc” that projects around us our past, our future, our 
human milieu, our physical situation, our ideological situation, and our moral 
situation, or rather, that ensures that we are situated within all of these relationships. 
The intentional arc creates the unity of the senses, the unity of the senses with 
intelligence, and the unity of sensitivity and motricity.101 
The intentional arc draws together the intertwined aspects of our existence, making them 
inseparable components that influence our lives. How our bodies perceive the world and 
respond to it is informed and conditioned by the material and immaterial relationships, 
influences, and obstacles that make up the milieu of our world and are part of this 
intentional arc. My field of presence when I grasp my keys does not exist in a vacuum 
because the meaning that is made in that moment tethers together my consciousness, my 
external horizons, and my perceiving body. The multitude of horizons under which I 
perceive my tardiness informs my body’s pre-reflective performance to swiftly grasp the 
keys, find the door, and start my car.  
The Habit Body 
As my body flows through moments, it’s motions pre-reflectively draw upon a 
system of equivalent positions that it has learned in previous spaces and times. This is the 
makeup of my body schema, which Merleau-Ponty describes as an understanding of one’s 
body as possessing a variety of motor tasks that are instantly transposable.102 The 
transposibility of movements is not as simple as applying an individual movement to 
 
101 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 137. 
102 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 142. 
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individual stimuli because the activities and conditions with which my body performs are 
never identical. Grasping my keys might resemble my motions to reach and grasp for the 
salt on the table, but how my body carries out these tasks requires different amalgamations 
of perception and engagement. The objects that I handle solicit my touch differently by 
way of their material make-up. 
The reach and grasp I use to procure my keys are not simply predicated on a 
cognitive evaluation of comparative length, whereby I consciously recognize the reach is 
two feet. Places in space are not objective positions in relation to the position of our bodies 
but are points that solicit and capture our intentions, and through this performance I learn 
the space by bestowing intention and meaning onto an object. Objects also become 
extensions of our bodies, whereby we understand space through them. When I pass the 
saltshaker to my friend, I know that the shaker adds inches to my reach, and I find my 
friend’s grasp at the other end of it and not at my fingertips. Passing the salt is a different 
spatial estimation than inserting my keys into my car door yet, in both cases my body’s 
motor functions employ the actions of reach, grasp, and maneuvering an object as an 
extension of the body.  
The system of equivalences our bodies acquire that inform the process of 
transposibility become habitual for our bodies. For our bodies to be habitual means that 
they understand the world in a way that is pre-reflective because they have sedimented 
experiences of those actions in the body. This is what Merleau-Ponty asserts is the body’s 
way of “gearing into” the world, which he means as the body’s grasp that attunes it to the 
world, or the way in which the body takes hold of and adapts to the world around it.103 The 
body’s ability to gear in helps it incorporate new understandings that then become 
sedimented once the body can carry out the task appropriately. The body’s ability to 
transpose these sedimentations means it carries not only “a system of current positions, but 
 
103 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 497. Endnote 47 Translator Donald Landes explains Merleau-Ponty’s terms “the 
gearing”…“to gear into” as “Although the image is certainly one of “gears” fitting together, Merleau-Ponty draws upon 
the figurative aspects of this image such that the “fit” is something that is to be accomplished in the act, not something 
pre-determined by the shape of the gears and teeth. This is captured by the sense of the English verb “to gear (in)to” 
when it is used to mean “to adjust” or “to adapt” something to a particular purpose.” 
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also, and consequently, as an open system of an infinity of equivalent positions in different 
orientations.”104 This is more precisely what Merleau-Ponty terms “the body schema,” 
which he describes as “not merely an experience of my body, but rather an experience of 
my body in the world.”105 Although these movements take place below the level of 
conscious activity, bodily habits cannot be reduced to reflex because each circumstance 
requires that the body become accustomed to something new. In which case, we can say 
that habit occupies the overlapping space of conscious and non-conscious being, a space 
in which our body conjures the accord between “what we aim at and what is given, between 
the intention and the realization.”106  
Distinguishing between the habitual body and the actual body, Merleau-Ponty 
argues that the two bodies consistently co-penetrate each other.107 The actual body is the 
body of reflexive existence, meaning it allows me to understand the physiological 
processes of how to reach and grasp. The habitual body is the pre-reflexive body that knows 
how to reach, grasp and handle the saltshaker or the keys as part of its own being. These 
two bodies co-penetrate each other as we switch between movements and adjust to the task 
required. This is how we stitch together our body’s intentions with objects to realize our 
consciousness. 
To summarize, this section has discussed the basic characteristics that comprise the 
habit body. Our bodies in the world allow us to perceive and are therefore essential to 
attaining consciousness. How we know ourselves is dependent on how we know ourselves 
in relation to the temporal and spatial perceptual encounters we have with the external 
world. We extend our bodies towards objects we interact with to fulfil our intentions and 
desires, which are imminently connected to our past experiences and future aspirations. 
 
104 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 142. 
105 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 142. 
106 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 146. 
107 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 84. Merleau-Ponty discusses the habit body and the actual body in regards to patients 
who have lost a limb: “In the case we are considering, the ambiguity of knowledge amounts to this: it is as though our 
body comprises two distinct layers, that of the habitual body and that of the actual body. Gestures of manipulation that 
appear in the first have disappeared in the second, and the problem of how I can feel endowed with a limb that I no longer 
have in fact comes down to knowing how the habitual body can act as a guarantee for the actual body.” 
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Our body’s pre-reflective knowledge of the world is what makes it possible for us to move 
about without intellectual instruction, and it is built upon the body’s accumulation of 
experiences in which it employs transposable motor tasks. Our body schema is where each 
new exploration that requires transposable action becomes indexed or sedimented. The 
process of transposibility becomes habitual for our bodies, which means that our bodies 
can perform tasks as pre-reflective habits. This is how my body knows to handle my keys 
and the saltshaker appropriately without explicit instructions, and how it settles into the 
new shape. 
Our pre-reflective ways of being in the world are premised on two distinct yet 
interrelated habits of the body: habitual perception and habitual bodily response. These two 
functions do not necessarily correlate in any causal way but nourish each other to create 
bodies that habitually carry forward social and political structures in the world. Although 
our movements are pre-reflective, they are not inherently static. But before the discussion 
of changeable bodies can be had, it is necessary to understand how bodies bring culturally 
instituted worldviews into existence. What is at stake when bodies become correlates of 
these structures is the quality of consciousness that is produced. In the next section, I focus 
specifically on privileged bodies who tend to take up their positionalities in the world at 
the expense of their others.  
Habitual Perception and Bodily Response 
Perceptual habits formed in the individual are also cultivated in relation to the 
cultural level. Cultural habits of perception are ways of perceiving that have been instituted, 
whereby they produce influential new ways of understanding people, things, and relations 
between them.108 Habits that are shared culturally often reflect a sense for what is 
normative. Normative qualities are determined by hegemonic ideals, against which 
perceived bodies are judged. This implement of measure is not established in relation to  
true innateness of any particular body or bodies, but functions as fantasy or “an ontological 
 
108 Fielding, 156. “Ways of perceiving are also habits at the cultural and historical level –new ways of perceiving are 
instituted, and these institutions found new ways of moving and hence understanding, becoming part of the background 
against which things, people, and relations appear.” 
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principal in the sense of a ground and an origin.”109 In Broken Hegemonies, Reiner 
Schürmann refers to this presence as “hegemonic phantasm”: 
In order to constitute the phenomenality of phenomena, in order to universalize 
them, a representational order must organize itself around a principle, a phantasmic 
referent measuring all representations. A hegemonic phantasm so conceived not 
only directs us to refer everything to it, but has, furthermore, an endless supply of 
significations, that is to say, normative measures. It is the position [posé] to which 
all practical and cognitive laws relate, in the final instance, all acts and all 
phenomena.110 
The hegemonic phantasm is hegemonic in its being a horizon against which the figure is 
perceived relationally. It is phantasmic because it disappears in the moment that we 
encounter the figure, making the illusion appear real and absolute instead of a way our 
perception is learned and structured.  
Linda Alcoff’s work in Visible Identities speaks to the point that culturally 
instituted ways of perceiving act through the object-horizon to sediment perceptual habits. 
She argues that race is a structure of contemporary perception that constitutes the horizon 
rather than the figure that stands out. Racialization is a learned perceptual habit and it 
presents to us the figure and defines racialized people just as it becomes “tacit, almost 
hidden from view, and thus almost immune from critical reflection.”111 This horizon, 
against which all acts that I perceive stand out, is what I understand to be the natural setting 
of my thoughts. The learned-ness of my perception is difficult to locate and interrogate 
because my perception is a pre-reflective understanding of the world that precedes 
conscious evaluation. This does not mean that these habits of perception cannot change, 
but to change them requires making the faculties of perceiving visible.  
While Alcoff and Schürmann bring attention to how race works from the ground of 
the object-horizon structure, Alia Al-Saji’s work on The Racialization of Muslim Veils 
brings attention to what this means for revealing the figure. Al-Saji argues that each time 
 
109 Reynolds, 245. 
110 Schürmann, 11. 
111 Alcoff, 188.  
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a Muslim woman is perceived against western representations of Muslim women, she is 
marked or pre-determined as oppressed. The woman is not simply seen as veiled, nor is 
she seen as she appears to herself or even as she might describe herself and her individual 
circumstances as not oppressive. She is seen as a pre-determined discursive representation 
who “cannot be seen as otherwise,” and who “ cannot be seen as a subject who takes up 
and constitutes itself through that oppression.”112 The Muslim woman becomes visible as 
a figure whose victimhood and voiceless-ness is overdetermined. Simultaneously, the 
woman becomes invisible in that her perceived lack of subjectivity means she needs to be 
spoken for in political life, divesting her of a self-originating voice.113  The object-horizon 
structure then does not simply operate to reveal the figure or object in itself. Instead, it 
reveals and conceals particular traits of the figure whereby it appears already loaded with 
meaning.  
In The Habits of Racism, Helen Ngo discusses the habitual reactions that emerge 
from white women’s interactions with racialized others. Movements such as tensing, 
flinching, and moving away, are all examples of unthinking racist bodily habits that she 
carries in her bodily repertoire and that are “available to her upon the unanticipated 
interaction with a Black man.”114 These reactions cannot necessarily be explained by 
bodily reflex or unconscious bias because reactions vary dependent upon the stereotypes 
perceived. This is to say that the woman’s reaction to two differently racialized men would 
not be identical. The habitual reaction correlates with the stereotype, just as Merleau-Ponty 
describes habit as “the power of responding with a certain type of solution to a certain form 
of situation.115 The horizon and its ability to comport itself as a hegemonic phantasm is 
thus an integral component for habituating racializing perception and response.  
 
112 Al-Saji, “Racialization,” 885. 
113 Al-Saji, “Racialization,” 877. “That the image of the Muslim woman forms a kind of ‘constitutive outside’ (to use 
Judith Butler’s term) explains the exclusionary and silencing function played by this representation. Although what is 
represented as inevitably oppressive is the Muslim veil in general, it is representations of the veil themselves 
that demand and enforce the exclusion of Muslim women.” 
114 Ngo, 23. 
115 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 143. 
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While these habits are perceptual toward the figure-horizon arrangement, they are 
also premised on the perception of one’s own body as situated within the event. The 
unanticipated encounter between the white woman and the racialized man in Ngo’s 
description of racist bodily habits is again useful for grounding this claim. A white woman 
who fears the stereotype of the Black man will react differently than the racialized man she 
encounters during the unexpected meeting. This is because the body of the perceiver is “the 
always unimplied third term of the figure-background structure, and each figure appears 
perspectivally against the double horizon of external space and bodily space.” 116 The white 
woman’s awareness of her body as having an intersection of certain qualities – whiteness, 
petite stature, femininity –informs her perception of the figure she perceives, under the 
hegemonic horizon. Not only does her body understand him to be representative of 
violence, but her body also understands itself as being a likely victim to that violence. Her 
reaction is therefore not just to a stereotype she understands cognitively nor one that is 
implied by the object-horizon structure. The interaction she has engages her entire body in 
the meaning-making system underpinned by the hegemonic order.  
For the racialized man in the encounter, the woman may pose an immediate 
physical threat should she panic and call out for help although, additionally he feels her to 
be a psychic threat. Aware of his own perceptible bodily qualities and what they mean 
within the hegemonic horizon, he perceives her gaze as overdetermining him from the 
outside by correlating his body with violent perpetrators.117 The habitual perception and 
bodily reactions that emerge from both people are therefore in accord with the figure they 
encounter, as it is imbued with particular attributes by the phantasmic horizon. But their 
reactions also reflect what the hegemonic order determines they will be to each other – 
perpetrator and victim – as bodies that make meaning of that order through lived 
experience.  
 
116 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 103. 
117 Fanon, 95. See Frantz Fanon’s discussion of the white gaze. 
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The Performance of Privilege   
Bodily racism is one example of many sedimented biases that reflect the hegemonic 
horizon. These implements of measure condition our bodily extensions into the world, 
thereby shaping our consciousness. The performance of privilege exemplifies a style of 
bodily comportment that is acquired from receiving anticipated responses from the 
world.118 For Merleau-Ponty, the flow between action and response is how the body 
understands itself as geared into the world, a world that it successfully knows or is trying 
to correct itself to know with every move it makes. Privileged bodies will, therefore, 
understand how to extend themselves differently than bodies that do not fit the desired or 
normative form.  
The sense of entitlement and bodily confidence will vary between individuals in 
particular circumstances. Performances in spaces like predominantly white male corporate 
settings in North America might elicit unexpected or variant responses from bodies who 
feel themselves to be a source of unease for those around them – such as nervousness, a 
wavering voice, or an overly stern demeanor. These bodies become conscious of 
themselves by extending into spaces where they encounter significantly more obstacles 
than their normative colleagues. The hostility of these environments creates for them an 
uneasy passage through space, demonstrating that bodily relations to space are not equal 
and as such, spaces are not neutral.  
In contrast, privileged bodies that are uninhibited and unobstructed will take up 
physical or aural space with confidence. These bodies extend themselves under the 
assumption that they belong in particular settings because their movements within the field 
of perception feel natural. Unable to perceive the kinds of obstacles that marked bodies 
encounter, privileged bodies approach others assuming that all behavior is innate to a 
person’s moral fiber. While the marked body may choose to avoid the corporate setting 
 
118 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 261. “My body is geared into the world when my perception provides me with the 
most varied and the most clearly articulated spectacle possible, and when my motor intentions, as they unfold, receive 
the responses they anticipate from the world.” 
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because of its aggressiveness towards them,119 they are perceived to be unambitious or 
incapable by the normative figure who believes all bodies experience space as they do.120 
The consciousness of the privileged body is therefore different from its others because it 
understands itself as naturally unproblematic. 
If the bodies of marked others appear as problematic – or as an object that causes 
unease –  then the privileged person can justify and feel entitled to even the most extreme 
reactions. This is how bodily habits carry forth the hegemonic order and realize systems of 
oppression.121 Examples of this are readily seen in biased legal administration and police 
brutality towards African American men in the United States. In Judith Butler’s reading of 
the Rodney King beating she discusses how the perception of African American men as 
dangerous, worth less, and requiring control, led to the “phantasmic production of 
‘intention’ that was put upon King’s frozen body.”122 Although King lay unmoving in the 
street as he was violently struck, he was understood as likely to endanger and therefore 
deserving of the blows he received. The faculties through which King was perceived made 
him visible in a particular way whereby what is known and believed makes the figure 
visible fixed with meaning. Through this frame, King is seen a priori as an agent of 
violence, and as such, his self-defense is interpreted as violent expression. Conversely, the 
movements of privileged bodies are more often than not given credence when their actions 
are perceived under the hegemonic horizon and hence, the verdict of the King case 
determined the four officers “not guilty.” The discursive representation of the violent Black 
man was re-inscribed through the bodies of the police officers who created a violent 
performance of perpetrator and victim, and the hegemonic order was re-established through 
the phantasmic production of “intention” that was circulated throughout the media.  
 
119 Ngo, 75. See Ngo’s discussion on the ways that “racialization and racism can change one’s bodily disposition on the 
level of inclination and desire.”  
120 Sullivan, “Expansiveness,” 250. See Sullivan’s argument regarding the ontological expansion of the white privileged 
class as premised on the denial of the spatiality of situation. 
121 Examples of these reactions herald the criminalization of blackness and are referred to in academia and on social 
media by the phrase “living while black.” See Howell et al. on the long-standing practice of policing black people for 
mundane actions. 
122 Butler, 18. 
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Thus far, I have presented a view of the privileged habit body as an important player 
in the reproduction of systems of oppression. Bodies take on cultural habits of perception 
because their movements are informed by the hegemonic horizon. Under this horizon, the 
ideal determines the confines of what normative is as a measure against which bodies are 
judged. The hegemonic horizon is a phantasm because it disappears in order to present the 
figure to us and leads us to believe we see the figure through the natural setting of our 
thoughts. This, in effect, conceals the hegemonic influence on our perception, which has 
taught us how to see the figure as it is presented to us already loaded with meaning. This 
perceptual framework sediments in the body to produce habitual perception that is biased 
in accordance with the hegemonic order.  
Our perceptual habits carry a fortifying relationship with our habitual reactions that 
further obscures our ability to locate the ways our habitual faculties are being structured. 
As discussed, habitual reactions are pre-reflective but not bodily reflex, as they are 
responses unique to each encounter. These reactions are also based upon our learned 
perception of the figure and therefore, what the hegemonic order determines they are to 
our bodies. While privileged bodies extend with confidence and the expectation of ease 
because they encounter fewer obstacles, marked bodies extend with caution or avoid 
certain spaces altogether to avoid hostility and unease. The privileged body, unable to 
perceive the multitude of obstacles presented to other bodies, understands the other as 
morally worth less than their unproblematic selves. Based on their habitual perception of 
marked bodies as problematic or potentially problematic, normative bodies can justify 
extreme reactions that are pre-reflective or even conscious because they are perceived to 
be worthy of credence. The performance of those reactions re-inscribes and re-establishes 
the hegemonic power relations of bodies and does little to make the phantasmic perceptual 
framework visible. 
As I have discussed, our pre-reflective ways of being in the world are premised on 
two distinct yet interrelated habits of the body: habitual perception and habitual bodily 
response. These two functions nourish each other to create bodies that carry forward 
hegemonic structures into the world as habit. While habit bodies extend into the world pre-
reflectively, they are not necessarily unchangeable or unchanging. I turn now to Ngo’s 
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discussion on the theoretical concepts of habit versus sedimentation to locate agency and 
responsibility within the overlapping space of conscious and non-conscious being. 
Ultimately, my intention is to un-monumentalize privileged bodies.  
Sedimentation and Habit 
The construction of perceptual habit is reliant upon a process of cumulative 
learning, whereby each transposable event sediments in the body a new layer of 
understanding. The information gathered builds in the body “an historical record of 
experience, context, emotions, taboos and desires” that can be called upon to perform 
future actions.123 Sedimentation is not a conceptual understanding through which I am able 
to stitch together images or other mental perceptions of my surroundings. My surroundings 
are familiar to me because “I hold “in my hands” or “in my legs” its principal distances 
and directions, and only if a multitude of threads run out toward it from my body.”124 I 
hold in my legs the number of paces to the dresser and in my hands the grasp I use for my 
keys. The perceptual acquisition of my surroundings presents to me my consciousness, and 
in doing so, it structures my understanding of the world in relation to my personal horizons. 
Habit bodies are formed based upon a particular body’s understanding of itself in the world, 
which means that my body is constantly learning how to perceive a world that is not 
understood as the same by everybody. This is how an individual’s body schema takes 
shape, as a correlate structure of their perceived world which then comes to determine how 
we perceive the world. 
 In The Habits of Racism, Helen Ngo discusses the tension between sedimentation 
and habit regarding their utility for future action. She argues that while the metaphor of 
sedimentation is useful for describing the “settling in” of body habit, it also implies “a 
relative inertia or passivity” in regards to future-looking.125 Sedimentation is restrictive in 
the sense that it brings us no further than the descriptive histories that accumulate and 
 
123 Guenther, 13.  
124 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 131-2. 
125 Ngo, 4. 
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ground the past in our bodies. A focus on sedimentation then is a focus on a past that is 
heavy, geologically solidified, and inert in the body.126 Viewing the body as a sedimented 
being is perhaps a difficult approach for understanding the body’s capabilities of “I can” 
mainly because it overly determines the body’s possibilities.  
Habit, in contrast, employs the motor capabilities that make up the body schema to 
launch us forward and influence which new skills my body can acquire. The habit body 
evaluates the outer world that it perceives through sensing that is learned and transposable. 
My evaluation with each movement is an understanding of my body as capable or incapable 
of interacting with some objects and desiring some objects more than others. Merleau-
Ponty explains this procedure through the example of acquiring dance skills, whereby the 
new skill of dance draws upon the already acquired movements of walking and running.127 
This progression of motility means I can – I sense I can – acquire the skill of dance based 
on the skills my body schema already holds and makes available to me. This also influences 
the translation of the new skill into my body schema, such as a ballet dancer and a street 
dancer might adapt to the style of breakdance differently.128 The habit body gives me a 
sense of what is possible based on what I sense to be my existing capabilities, but it is 
always open to acquiring new sedimentations that alter past habits. 
The relationship between sedimentation and habit is not one of direct 
correspondence. Merleau-Ponty makes clear that habits do not directly draw upon hardened 
layers of sedimentation, as habits are formed and maintained through a process that 
requires constant reworking of our movements to express “the energy of our present 
consciousness.”129 While sedimented layers are ever-present in the body, habits require the 
work of holding them “in my hands” and “in my legs.” What is presented to the body in 
the moment is evaluated by the perceiving body as it negotiates within the various horizons 
that nourish its understanding of its past and its future prospects. The skills that the body 
 
126 Ngo, 38. 
127 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 144. 
128 Ngo, 4. The dance style adaptation example is Ngo’s. 
129 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 132. 
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then applies emerge from its sedimentations as a pre-reflective event, but the body must be 
discerning based on its future-looking intentions. This is to say that if a trained ballerina 
takes up breakdance her bodily comportment must do away with the balletic style of arm 
and leg extensions but keep her power and flexibility. This is a process of bodily knowing 
that is pre-reflective, but as she develops her habitual movements, they can be consciously 
reflected upon. This reflection can come in the form of a teacher or peers who assess her 
performance as part of the process through which she applies their instruction to actively 
hone her craft. The task of transposition, therefore, inhabits the overlapping space of 
conscious and non-conscious being, the space in which our body conjures the accord 
between “what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the realization.”130  
I bring attention to Ngo’s insights on the relationship between habit and 
sedimentation because I am concerned with problematizing the ways that privileged bodies 
take up space. Seen from the perspective of sedimentation, the privileged body is 
determined to be a figure that perpetually recreates the status quo. However, understanding 
privileged bodies as habitually maintaining the status quo by actively holding habits brings 
the responsibility of interrogating their perceptual frameworks back to them. As Ngo 
argues, this implication undermines their ability to do nothing and fallback on blaming 
marked bodies or the hegemonic structures they can claim are coercing their behavior.131 
With this in mind, it is also always the case that the expectation of responsibility needs to 
consider the heterogeneous make-up of bodies in relation to the normative measure. Being 
aware of one’s body as the implied third term of the object-horizon structure is necessary 
to reflect upon the ways that bodies are complex in their ability to take up privilege in some 
spaces and not others. Our task of taking responsibility for our habits is then, as unique as 
the bodily horizons that inform our habitual perception and response.  
 
130 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 146. 
131 Ngo, 43. 
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Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have presented a reading of the habit body as a vehicle for being 
in the world. Our bodies in the world allow us to perceive and are therefore essential to 
attaining consciousness. The quality of that consciousness is predicated upon the many 
horizons in which we perceive space, objects and ourselves, relationally. These horizons 
are influenced by hegemonic beliefs that structure our relations but appear to us as the 
natural setting of our thoughts. When the learned-ness of our perceptual framework alludes 
us, we understand the figure – who appears to us loaded with meaning – as being innately 
represented. This is how privileged bodies, who do not experience the same obstacles as 
marked bodies, perceive others to be problematic and deserving of oppressive or biased 
response. The ways in which we perceive figures and our responses to them become 
habitual as we perform them. What is at stake in this process is that bodies become 
correlates of oppressive systems and as such their actions re-instate the status quo.  
In addition to discussing the habit body as a vehicle for maintaining hegemonic 
order, I have also conferred alongside Ngo that habits of bodies are open to change. While 
the habit body caries sedimentations of past experiences that it can draw upon, it discerns 
which sedimentations it will use based on its immediate circumstances and intentions and 
future aspirations. This means that the habit body is not condemned to repeat patterns of 
biased perception and response, provided their habits are given reflection and interrogation. 
To take responsibility for our habitual modes of being in the world requires us to be aware 
that bodily relations to space are not equal and space is not neural. How we conduct 
ourselves in space is relational to the figures around us under our own unique personal 
horizons. We must therefore develop a mode of self-reflexivity that speaks to the 
particularities of the bodily horizons that inform our habit bodies. 
 
52 
 
Chapter Two: The Settler Habit Body 
Introduction  
In this chapter, I bring the lens of the habit body to investigate the efficacy of settler 
bodies for performing decolonization. I discuss case studies that are concerned with the 
contentious issues of settler-Indigenous relations. I apply and contextualise key terms 
derived from phenomenology, metaphysics, and affect theory (anchorage points, 
perspective, ontological expansiveness, and pressure points) to read and describe 
settlerness. My overarching aim in this chapter is to demonstrate how to shift from the 
theoretical work of habituation into an embodied perspective of settlerness in 21st century 
Canada.  
This chapter builds upon the work of Eva Mackey because her ethnographic 
research with settlers is descriptive and conceptual and therefore provides a “sweaty” basis 
for analysing the settler habit body.132 Focusing on land rights conflicts in Canada and the 
US, Mackey investigates “settler certainty,” which she describes as the ontological 
certainty of settler entitlement to lands that is based on the myth of solo settler 
sovereignty.133 This myth is kept alive over generations and involves narratives that herald 
the progressiveness and necessity of settlement and the hard-fought wins of settlers. 
According to Mackey, the arguments settlers use to oppose Indigenous land rights seem to 
be the only ones available to them, perhaps because they are premised upon “long-standing 
and unquestioned ontologies and epistemologies.”134 She asserts that such onto-
epistemological arguments are deep-seated, persistent, flexibly applicable over time and in 
various contexts, and developed over centuries to produce the self-evident certainty of 
entitlement.135 The specificities of these justifications rely upon contrived understandings 
of Indigenous lifeways, which are regarded as “inferior, undeserving and unacceptable,” 
and Indigenous land claims, which are thought to be “unreasonable, unnatural and 
 
132 See my discussion in chapter 1 regarding Sara Ahmed’s sweaty concepts. 
133 Mackey, Unsettled, 132. 
134 Mackey, Unsettled, 36.  
135 Mackey, Unsettled, 125. 
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dangerous.”136 The arguments that prop up the right to settlement conjure the nurturing 
relationships between land acquisition and the calumny of Aboriginal nations. 
For Mackey, the lineage of colonialism has merged the epistemological work of 
ideology with administrative, policing, and legal structural and material efforts to solidify 
a settled form of property relations. These relations are frequently referred to by settlers as 
the expected order that has been, and therefore always should be. Re-iterated over the 
course of centuries, these moments of referral are expressions of “settled expectations,” 
wherein “fantasies of entitlement” are present as axiomatic assumptions of settler 
peoples.137 Mackey argues that the axiomatic assumptions of settlers act as “cognitive 
prisons” that need to be unsettled in order for them to take up the task of re-imagining how 
they can be otherwise and bring about equitable land relations.138 She also argues that 
because colonization is a material process, decolonization must also be a material process 
that includes repatriation.139 However, in order for settlers to be able to “imagine the 
possibilities of such material change and conceptual re-imagining,” they will have to 
undergo what Mackey refers to as an “epistemological shift” towards a stance of settler 
uncertainty and openness, as a starting point to practise and imagine otherwise.”140  
In the first section of this chapter, I seek to complicate Mackey’s assertion that an 
epistemological shift is an efficacious strategy for decolonization. I argue that 
contemporary settlement is not a structure that begins from the mental faculties of the 
settler. While their epistemological slant may give the settler justification for their 
entitlement, it is their bodies that are responsible for performing the tasks of settlement. 
The relationship between how the settler intellectually justifies their entitlement and how 
their bodies carry out the tasks of settlement is inextricably linked but, as I will discuss, 
carnal knowing is the settler’s first knowing. Settlement is therefore not as much a 
cognitive prison as it is a material world in which settler bodies are enmeshed.  
 
136 Mackey, Unsettled,125. 
137 Mackey, Unsettled, 34. 
138 Mackey, Unsettled, 125.  
139 Mackey, Unsettled, 125. 
140 Mackey, Unsettled, 126. 
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Drawing briefly upon Shannon Sullivan, Mackey considers ontological expansiveness 
as a philosophical basis that “underpins both the strategy and rationale for the self -ascribed 
entitlement to conquer the world.”141 Ontological expansiveness is a way of being in the 
world for privileged bodies, who extend with the attitude that all spaces are and should be 
open to their presence because they possess superior knowledge. Mackey’s focus on 
ontological expansiveness positions it as an intellectual way of knowing the world that 
settlers use to justify their rights to dominate negotiations regarding land relations, based 
on their perception that they know more and know better than their sovereign partners. I 
elaborate on Mackey’s discussion using Sullivan’s work to explore how ontological 
expansiveness is bound up with the habitual perceptual and response faculties of the settler 
habit body, whereby their knowing more or better is a way that their body knows the world. 
In drawing attention to the integral function that being in the world provides for making 
the settler body, I aim to give a more nuanced argument for the necessity of material 
decolonization.  
In the second section of this chapter, I take up Mackey’s assertion that the axiomatic 
assumptions of settlers’ certainty need to be unsettled to open the settler to material 
decolonization. I build upon my discussion in part one, which represents the 
epistemological paradigm of the settler as inextricably linked to the sedimentations in their 
body, to determine that unsettling their certainty requires interrupting their habitual 
faculties. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s concept of anchorage points, I unpack the 
differences between interruptions to settler certainty that impede decolonizing action and 
those that are required. I conclude that settlers must be anchored in some way in 
colonization in order for them to become decolonizing.  
The final section of this chapter expands upon my claim that the structure of settlement 
that is habitual in the settler body is useful for the work of decolonization. I work with 
Ahmed’s insights concerning lines of orientation to show that traversing lines of settlement 
orients settlers by way of normative pressures. These pressures are familiar to the settler 
body as ways of knowing the world. Difficult encounters for the settler introduce the 
feeling of new pressures that threaten their ways of knowing because they carry the 
 
141 Mackey, Unsettled, 183. 
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potential to reveal knowing as also not-knowing. I argue that to turn towards these 
challenges is to face up to accepting that the onto-epistemological perspective of settlers is 
situated. To engage with such confrontations is not an exercise of intellectually accepting 
this assertion, it is an exercise of practising resiliency during the event of feeling ruptured. 
Ultimately, this chapter argues that in order for decolonizing strategies to be successful, 
they need to work with the intricacies of the settler habit body.  
Living Settlement  
In her discussions on Western epistemological frameworks, Mackey argues that the 
ontological certainty of settlers is based on epistemologies of mastery. In this framework, 
the acquisition of knowledge garners power and determines who is the authority. This is to 
say that if I can claim to know more than anyone else, then I can claim to know what is 
best for all. Such claims secure knowledge and protect it from being diminished by way of 
interrogation or reform. In addition to being an accumulative project of knowing more, 
epistemology is also social, which means that knowing is a general cognitive ideal that is 
hierarchical and ascribes to normative ways of knowing.142 Colonialism has always sought 
to subsume Indigenous worldviews into Western – national – frameworks that claim 
themselves to be superior.143 The seemingly self-evident superiority of settlers is bolstered 
by claims of knowing more and knowing better, and it ensures their certainty of entitlement 
to lands.  
To focus on the mental aspects of knowing disregards the embodied-ness of 
subjectivity and the constitutive function our senses provide for our knowing. To know 
ourselves as superior is not just an intellectual knowing, but a sensing endeavor that allows 
us to feel and become conscious of our superiority. Early colonialism, for example, did not 
accumulate knowledge of lands and people only by way of ideas or mental imagery. 
Colonialism in Canada was built upon traversing and mapping lands, trading with people, 
and generally immersing settler bodies in the world. Colonialism is a material structure in 
 
142 Mills, 110. 
143 Mackey, Unsettled, 126. 
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which settler bodies move about to work, play, and generally live their everyday lives. For 
modern settlers, each perceptual extension they make is an interaction with the physical 
landscapes, administrative and legal systems, and social domain that they perceive in 
accordance with horizons that are hegemonic. Their immediate field of presence, how they 
sense within their situation, is what forms their consciousness of being. As I discuss in 
chapter one, horizons determine how we apprehend figures by giving us a perceptual 
framework to evaluate them, overdetermine them, and dictate the nature of our relationship 
to them. The habitual perceptions and responses of settlers provide them with a sense of 
superiority over Aboriginal peoples. This social order permeates settlers’ extensions into 
space and bolsters their understanding of themselves as inhabiting an “omniscient position” 
that claims itself to be above Indigenous sovereignty.144 The entitlement to know, or to 
express one’s knowing thus requires a feeling of certainty that settlers acquire from 
habitually taking up space as specialists of knowing. The ontological certainty of settlers 
is therefore bound up with bodily performances.  
I turn now to Sullivan’s work on ontological expansiveness because I see it as 
purposeful for bringing the cognitive knowing that Mackey suggests impedes 
performances of material decolonization, to the settler habit body. While Sullivan writes 
in the tradition of American pragmatism and not phenomenology her work is descriptive, 
whereby social transactions are taken to reveal the unconscious habits of whiteness. While 
Mackey turns to Sullivan to argue that the model of ontological expansiveness has been 
the philosophical basis for the epistemological legacies we have inherited, I see Sullivan’s 
work to be saying more about how those philosophies are experienced and reified.    
Ontological expansiveness is defined as the tendency for people with social 
privilege to assume that all spaces are and should be available for extending oneself 
unproblematically.145 These spaces can be geographical, within which one’s body moves 
around the space, or spaces where their movement is a figurative expression, such as 
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linguistic, artistic, or economic presence.146 Ontological expansiveness as it is performed 
by early colonizers emerged from a particular set of wilderness narratives and terra nullius 
arguments. 147 Lands that were thought to be uninhabited because they were not developed 
in the eyes of the colonizer were assumed to be available to those most qualified to 
implement the settlement project.  
Settlement at present is a structure that does not require settlers to acknowledge 
these narratives, which they may even perceive to be ridiculous and unfair. Current national 
attitudes towards colonization, such as those displayed in official apologies, position 
colonialism in Canada as a past event, as a way to show contemporary settlement as an 
advancement.148 However, Mackey has found that settlers recall these stories when they 
feel their rights are threatened, to strengthen their “fantasies of entitlement.” She defines 
these fantasies as built upon a logic that is “socially embedded, unconscious expectations 
of how the world will work;” This logic is “relied upon to reaffirm social locations, 
perceptions and benefits of privilege that have been legitimized through repeated 
experiences across lifetimes and generations.”149 What I find notable in Mackey’s account 
is not that settlers are telling a story that they learned as if it is an indisputable logical 
explanation.  More problematically, their fantasies have become real and legitimate to them 
through repeated experiences that precede their lifetime but carry through their living 
settlement.  
Ontological expansiveness can be found when settlers tend towards performances 
of epistemological domination in instances of land relations.  In these scenarios, the settler 
who believes they know more defines a problem that impacts Indigenous peoples and then 
determines the solution without any self-reflection on the situatedness of their perspective 
and its limitations for forming equitable outcomes. Mackey’s ethnographic work analyses 
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such events against ideological assumptions that stabilize settler certainty. In one scenario, 
the Caldwell First Nations was met with resistance during negotiations to purchase 
agricultural land in Chatham-Kent, Ontario. The Chatham-Kent Community Network 
(CKCN), which is comprised of settlers, argued that “providing Indians with such good 
agricultural land in Chatham-Kent was a waste.”150 Underpinning their assumptions were 
“normative judgements about the inferiority of Indigenous peoples” that are often used to 
“bolster the sense of entitlement to superintend Indigenous peoples.”151 Mackey found that 
settlers’ comments on the matter were suggestive of Lockean ideals concerning labor and 
the superiority of “improving labor,” which they initially felt the Caldwell were not capable 
of nor intending to accomplish. Some of their statements expressed concern that the 
Caldwell would let the land fall fallow and swampy, to return it to the state of nature. 
Mackey argues that these assumptions echo Locke’s conceptualization that “people who 
exist in “a state of nature” are not seen to have rational societies and governance.”152 
Settlers began to focus on the issue of land drainage, and they became concerned that the 
Caldwell would follow their own rules and not comply with provincial regulations or work 
with the community. These issues continued to be a source of distress for the community, 
even though the Caldwell clearly stated their willingness to work with the local community 
and form an agreement with the municipal government, on several occasions.  
The strong reactions voiced by the community in Chatham-Kent were indicative of 
their insecurities regarding control. One man named James stated his doubt regarding what 
he perceived to be a juristic imbalance:   
E[va]: In the case of drainage, wouldn’t the reserve and the municipality make some 
kind of agreement? 
J[ames]: Who enforces it? If a reserve and a municipality reach an agreement, and 
the municipality violates that agreement, the natives can go to the provincial 
government and say “They’re not living up to their agreement” – and force them to 
live up to it! But there’s nobody to force the natives...There’s no clause that says if 
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particular interview, one settler argued, “This is 2002 and how far do you want to take your culture? Do you want to take 
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the natives don’t negotiate on good faith “we’ll come in and impose a settlement.” 
So, there’s no threat to the natives, but there’s certainly a threat to the 
municipality.153 
Mackey finds in this and other concerns raised by settlers that their source of insecurity 
was not the drainage issue but shifting relations of power and authority. While the Caldwell 
First Nation’s Chief Larry Johnson states in his letter to the Chatham-Kent community that 
they were willing to negotiate and compromise, he also pointed out that the Caldwell are a 
separate government with authority over their land.154 The basis on which control was 
being allotted shifted. Settlers initially resorted to historically rooted narratives concerning 
their superior farming knowledge and abilities and doubled down on this claim when they 
defined and pressed the problem of drainage. They became increasingly uncertain when 
they found their claims to superiority were no longer substantial enough to superintend the 
Caldwell.  
The example of the Caldwell First Nation land purchase dispute exemplifies how 
settlers tend to perform epistemological domination by attempting to control the situation 
without any self-reflection on the situatedness of their perspective and its limitations for 
forming equitable outcomes. I refer to the perspective of the settler as “situated” because 
the settler body perceives and responds in accordance with the particularities of their 
individual horizons. Under these conditions, their relationship to Indigenous peoples is 
overdetermined by the hegemonic horizon which works to instill hierarchies. The settler’s 
certainty that they know and therefore should decide for others appears to them as a natural 
state of being because the horizon that issues their sense of superiority disappears in the 
moment they perceive the figure.  
The perspectives of settler bodies can thus be differentiated from the perspectives 
of Indigenous bodies, not only because their bodies perceive each other relationally under 
a hegemonic horizon, but also because Indigenous cosmologies and worldviews are not 
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necessarily ascribable to Euro-western philosophies.155 Epistemological domination is 
therefore not merely a problem of settlers assuming they know more, but that their onto-
epistemological frames for understanding the world are superior to Indigenous ways of 
knowing.  David Garneau has called the wielding of knowledge in power relations “the 
colonial attitude,” which he defines as “a drive to see, to traverse, to know, to translate (to 
make equivalent), to own, and to exploit.”156 The claim to settlement is based on the entire 
historical trajectory of living colonialism through which settlers can claim to be the knower 
over the known, a self-proclaimed stance of total mastery. 157 
The sense of ontological expansiveness that underpins epistemological domination 
does not always present itself in the form of blatantly racist historical narratives that see 
Indigenous peoples as incapable. In Decolonization is Not a Metaphor, Eve Tuck and K. 
Wayne Yang discuss their term, “settler moves to innocence,” which they define as a series 
of “strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or 
responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much 
at all.”158 These strategies, which find the settler claiming their innocence to reconcile their 
guilt and complicity and reframe settler futurity, appear in six themes. The first theme is 
“settler nativism,” wherein “settlers locate or invent a long-lost ancestor who is rumored 
to have had “Indian blood,” and they use this claim to mark themselves as blameless in the 
attempted eradications of Indigenous peoples.”159 This move to innocence allows settlers 
to expand into spaces under the assumption that they can deflect their settler identity.160 
Settler nativism gives the settler a sense of superior power because they can move between 
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spaces as either a settler or a settler who is biologically akin to Indigenous peoples and also 
as a morally evolved settler who is invested through ancestry in being an ally.  
The second theme is “settler adoption fantasies,” or fantasies in which the settler 
“becomes without becoming” [Indigenous].161 Such moves to innocence find the settler 
adopting Indigenous practices and knowledge to take the place of the other. Adoption 
fantasies mostly “refer to those narratives in the settler colonial imagination in which the 
Native (understanding that he is becoming extinct) hands over his land, his claim to the 
land, his very Indian-ness to the settler for safe-keeping.”162 The disintegration of 
Indigenous futurity is romanticized in this fantasy as a way to bolster settler futurity, which 
is repainted as a heroic effort. Sara Ahmed describes this theme as she sees it in the movie 
Dances with Wolves, 
to the point of being able to dance their dances...the white man in this example is 
able to “to become without becoming”...He alone is transformed through his 
encounter with the Sioux, while they remain the mechanism for his transformation. 
He becomes the authentic knower while they remain what is to be known and 
consumed, and spit out again, as good Indians who confirm the white man’s 
position as hero of the story...the Sioux remain objects, while Kevin Costner is able 
to go anywhere and be anything.163  
This second strategy allows the settler to become enlightened by knowing the other, which 
substantiates their position as an authentic knower over the known. Through the adoption 
fantasy, the settler garners their sense of superiority by way of the implied heroic efforts 
and the specialized knowledge they acquire, which equips them to become the safe keeper 
of lands. 
The third theme is “colonial equivocation,” whereby differentiated experiences of 
oppression are referred to as colonization. This claim maintains that “we are all colonized” 
in some way – by the patriarchy, by capitalism – in which case none of us are settlers. 
Vocalizations such as multiculturalism display this theme and are detrimental to 
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decolonization because they “ambiguously avoid engaging with settler colonialism; they 
are ambivalent about minority/people of color/colonized Others as settlers; they are cryptic 
about Indigenous land rights in spaces inhabited by people of color.”164 This strategic move 
to innocence allows settlers to feel that they are directly invested in eradicating the strife 
of others, which they identify as comparable to their own, even though their claims to being 
colonized do more to obscure the importance of Indigenous sovereignty and benefit their 
status as beneficiaries of treaty relations. Colonial equivocation facilitates the liberal notion 
of equality, through which settlers can feel confident to move about as if spaces are devoid 
of social hierarchies.  
The fourth move to innocence that Tuck and Yang identify is termed “free your 
mind and the rest will follow.” This strategic program asserts the importance of 
decolonizing the mind by pursuing critical consciousness. The focus of this approach is to 
enhance the knowing of the settler, by way of education and self-reflexive critique of settler 
epistemology. Tuck and Yang argue that such approaches are not sufficient for 
decolonization because they “allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable 
task of relinquishing stolen land.”165 The gap that these authors identify, between 
epistemological interrogation and material action put towards decolonization, is precisely 
what I aim to tackle in this thesis by emphasizing habit construction in settler bodies as an 
inextricable link between bodily performance and epistemological stance. Tuck and Yang 
point to this disconnect when they state, “Until stolen land is relinquished, critical 
consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we 
respectfully disagree with George Clinton and Funkadelic (1970) and En Vogue (1992) 
when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow.”166 I take from 
Tuck and Yang’s viewpoint that decolonizing action generally is not a system of oppression 
that is solved with a one size fits all strategy – what is suitable for George Clinton and the 
others mentioned is not suitable for Indigenous decolonization – which is why colonial 
equivocation is detrimental to instilling change. But coming back to the strategy of 
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conscientization, it is a form of ontological expansiveness because it arms the settler with 
a knowledgeable discourse of hyper criticality from which they can find a sense of moral 
righteousness and confidence to take up space with their knowing. Scenarios where white 
people witness racism against people of color and then proceed to explain structural racism 
to the racialized individual, exemplify instances where the privileged overextend their 
criticality with confidence. In such cases, the feeling that one knows and knows better 
provides the impetus for expansiveness, under the assumption that “helping” is 
unproblematic.  
 The fifth strategy is what Tuck and Yang refer to as “At risk-ing / Asterisk-ing 
Indigenous peoples.” This move to innocence is concerned with “the ways in which 
Indigenous peoples are counted, codified, represented, and included/disincluded by 
educational researchers and other social science researchers.”167 The visibility of 
Indigenous peoples in research and pedagogy represents them in two ways. The first is as 
“at risk” peoples, wherein they are described as “on the verge of extinction, culturally and 
economically bereft, engaged or soon-to-be engaged in self-destructive behaviors which 
can interrupt their school careers and seamless absorption into the economy.”168 These 
representations are present despite it being well known that the educational success of 
Indigenous students requires instruction in their languages and not in English, teachers who 
are familiar with their communities, and curricula that are designed to be “compelling, 
relevant, inspiring and meaningful” to their lives.169  
Simultaneously, this research renders Indigenous communities asterisk peoples, 
“meaning they are represented by an asterisk in large and crucial data sets, many of which 
are conducted to inform public policy that impacts our/their lives.”170 This strategy of 
representation positions Indigenous peoples in the margins of public discourse and 
conceals the erasure of Indigenous presence within the particularities of public policy. Tuck 
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and Yang argue that this strategy is a move to innocence because it is “a token gesture, an 
inclusion and an enclosure of Native people into the politics of equity” while it does not 
properly represent “Indigenous politics, educational concerns and epistemologies.”171 
These kinds of renderings comprise a core of knowing Indigenous peoples that is 
assimilative because it evaluates Indigenous sovereignty, ways of knowing, and ways of 
being within the onto-epistemological structure of settlement. Although this knowledge 
does not accurately represent the capabilities of Indigenous peoples, settlers can refer to 
them when substantiating their sense of superiority and their entitlement to superintend 
Indigenous peoples. 
 The final theme that Tuck and Yang discuss as a settler move to innocence is what 
they term “re-occupation and urban homesteading” which takes up the occupy movement 
and urban re-settling as an expression of re-occupation on stolen land. While the occupy 
movement was a welcome resistance strategy for the economically marginalized, its 
program elucidated the incommensurability between the political agendas of “re-occupy” 
and “decolonize.”172 Although the movement was anti-capitalist, it was also pro-colonial, 
as the authors state: “That is, the ideal of “redistribution of wealth” camouflages how much 
of that wealth is land, Native land. In Occupy, the “99%” is invoked as a deserving 
supermajority, in contrast to the unearned wealth of the “1%.” It renders Indigenous 
peoples (a 0.9% ‘super-minority’) completely invisible and absorbed, just an asterisk group 
to be subsumed into the legion of occupiers.”173 As a strategy that re-distributes wealth 
amongst settlers with no regard for the stolen lands that created that wealth, the occupy 
movement was a re-inscription of colonialism that obscured Indigenous land rights.  
Another occupation movement that conjures similar outcomes is urban 
homesteading, which “is the practice of re-settling urban land in the fashion of self-styled 
pioneers in a mythical frontier.”174 “Tradition” is emphasized in homesteading, and as such 
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this lifestyle often involves re-colonizing tactics, such as: claiming “Indian-like spirituality 
while evading Indigenous sovereignty and the modern presence of actual urban Native 
peoples;” “Claiming land for the Commons and asserting consensus as the rule of the 
Commons, [which] erases existing, prior, and future Native land rights, decolonial 
leadership, and forms of self-government.”175 Occupy movements are settler moves to 
innocence because they are anti-capitalist and thus appear to be beneficial for addressing 
the oppression of Indigenous peoples. 
 The overarching concern of these six moves to innocence finds the settler extending 
into space under the assumption that they are doing good things, whilst they evade land 
repatriation and other forms of material decolonization that directly affect their lives. 
Claiming innocence in these ways, which settlers take to be productive and morally sound, 
is more than an intellectual stance on social justice. Most importantly, these moves to 
innocence require settler bodies to take up space based on their claims to superior 
knowledge. This is to say that settlers perform these particular strategies because they seek 
to address socio-political problems, and they believe that they possess the know-how to 
accomplish the task. This becomes epistemological domination because settlers are not 
aware that their perspective on the matter is situated, and in assuming they know enough 
and know best how to confront the problem, they over-determine the scope of solutions.  
The settler body, believing itself to be all-knowing, can take up space in settler 
society with confidence. This is not to imply that all settlers navigate uninhibited and 
unobstructed, but their movements are not impeded in the same ways that Indigenous 
peoples experience. Settlers extend themselves under the assumption that they belong in 
particular settings because their movements within their field of perception feel natural. 
Unable to perceive the kinds of obstacles that Indigenous bodies encounter, the settler 
assumes that all liberal behavior is innate to a person’s moral fiber. While Indigenous 
peoples might choose to avoid particular settings that are hostile to them or be pushed into 
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particular spaces by the state’s neglect, their circumstances are perceived to be their own 
moral failings by the settler who believes all bodies experience space as they do.176  
To objectivize space in this manner is a condition of ontological expansiveness. 
According to Sullivan, ontological expansiveness is an unconscious habit performed by 
those with white class privilege, and it “operates by denying the spatiality of situation.”177 
Within this line of thinking, spatiality is assumed to be objective and thus neutral by the 
privileged figure. However, lived spatiality is where intending bodies move about in 
relation to other figures and horizons that give spatiality “racial, ethnic, and linguistic 
meaning.”178 The settler learns to extend with mastery and control by denying spatialized 
power relations, or more specifically, the privilege they acquire through these structures. 
While the settler can sense the power dynamics enough to perceive their knowing as 
superior, they understand their right to take up space as a specialist, as a natural event that 
should also be apparent to others. Each extension reifies the settler’s privilege spatially and 
sediments in them the reassurance that they belong everywhere.  
While ontological expansiveness in Sullivan’s work is associated with whiteness 
specifically, it defines a privileged bodily comportment with the world that impacts the 
lives of others. Which bodies are privileged and which are not is determined by the 
perceptive qualities of the body and the place in which the body extends. As discussed, 
settler bodies are privileged in Canada because their interactions in the world carry out the 
colonizing endeavor of the state, which gives their extensions a particular comportment. 
These interactions include everyday involvement in the Canadian economy – benefitting 
from it and laboring in it – which is largely dependent and built upon stolen lands, to further 
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one’s life and financial gain. This is not to diminish the fact that the marked bodies of 
settlers do experience systemic oppression in Canadian society. I only wish to draw 
attention to a line of delineation that distinguishes the maltreatment of Indigenous peoples 
from the marked bodies of settlers. As I have discussed, Indigenous peoples have been and 
are managed and policed differently than marked settlers because they are treaty holders 
and therefore possess legitimate sovereignties that threaten the state’s claim to sole 
dominion. The bodily comportment of settlers extend the settlement endeavor, meaning, as 
Kyle Powys White has argued, it carries forward the “desire, conscious and tacit, to erase 
Indigenous peoples.”179 These desires do not necessarily appear to the settler as Indigenous 
destruction, but reveal themselves as innocuous hopes for settler futurity.180 The settler 
body knows pre-reflectively how to strive to make it happen by engaging in the everyday 
events of settlement, which are simultaneously inequitable to Indigenous peoples.  
Thus far, I have attempted to show that colonization in Canada is not premised on 
the cognitive prisons or axiomatic assumptions that comprise settler knowing. Settlers are 
certain of their place in colonial Canada from living settlement, by occupying space with 
their performances of epistemological domination which become pre-reflective habits. To 
know is to traverse, to sense, and to interact with other figures, objects, and landscapes. 
For the contemporary settler, the embodied project of colonialism is laid out before them, 
sensible and available to establish their conscious understanding of their place in the world. 
Settlement is, therefore, not just an epistemological project that can be thwarted by thinking 
differently. It has been turned into material forms that are external to the settler and that 
their bodies learn to pre-reflectively navigate so that colonization becomes sedimented in 
their bodies. The necessity of material decolonization is therefore an integral component 
for settlers to understand their capacity for decolonization.  
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Anchorage, Perspective, and Disorientation 
 Mackey’s ethnographic account of settler entitlement discusses the disorientation 
that settlers feel when their rights to land are diminished or threatened.181 Their response 
is to defend their lineage of presence – their hard work and struggle on the lands – and to 
behave in accordance with their lineage of knowing what to argue to remain a settler that 
keeps settlement alive. While Mackey argues that socially embedded fantasies of 
entitlement are merely expectations that have become common-sense only to settlers and 
are, therefore, a perspective that requires constant maintenance to acquire material form,182 
I have discussed that these arguments are a perspective that is inextricably linked to the 
sedimentations and habitual faculties of the settler. Challenges to this perspective are thus 
impediments to the settler habit body, not just the intellectual arguments that they wield. 
This is perhaps why Mackey describes the affect that these confrontations have on the 
settler as being a felt experience, during which the settler utilizes the long-held arguments 
of settlement to push back against their “state of vertigo.”183   
 Mackey’s use of the term “vertigo” echoes Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that bodies 
who are perceptually unmoored from the continuity that facilitates their habitual states find 
themselves in a state of vertigo and nausea.184 To define and explain the importance of 
continuity, I turn to Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on anchorage points, which are the moorings 
through which bodies stabilize their worldviews and garner their certainty.185 Anchorage 
points are conceptual locations in the world at which subjects “gear in” by way of a spatial 
contract between their body and the world. These points include the vertical and horizontal 
positionings of door frames, windows and other objects that help us adjust our bodily 
movements to accomplish tasks. When I walk across the front hall to get my keys, my body 
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takes up the directions given to me by the objects in the room, which allow me to know 
how far up to raise my grasp, or what “up” is more generally. Objects in space and their 
spatial relations to each other provide for the perceiving body points of reference with 
which the body expresses its motility. By adjusting my bodily movements to these 
anchorage points, my phenomenal body gears into the world to have a maximal grip on the 
situation.  
When bodies become accustomed to moving about in a field of perception, they take 
up what Merleau-Ponty calls “a spatial level” within space. A spatial level is a point at 
which “maximum clarity in perception and action specifies a perceptual ground, a 
background for [my] life, a general milieu for the coexistence of [my] body and the 
world.”186 An individual possesses the world with his/her body as they gear into that spatial 
level at the intersection of their motor intentions and perceptual field.187 Each new spatial 
level that is encountered requires the subject to re-attain their sense of familiarity through 
bodily spatiality, by changing his/her approach to the environment. Such re-orientations 
inherently involve new comportments of the body to adjust accordingly.  
When I walk into my front hall to grasp my keys, the dresser and its perceptible 
qualities line up with the floor, the door frame and the other features of the room. The 
relationality of these objects to one another creates for my body a directional frame that I 
grasp by adjusting my comportment: my reach, my steps to approach, and my balance. My 
body navigates this room with ease because it has sedimented the knowledge required to 
be amongst the objects that frame its movements and that also allow my phenomenal body 
to be open to new situations and reshaping. Finding anchorage in this perceptual frame is 
always necessary for my body to become grounded, grasp or “possess” the world, so it can 
move about and extend with confidence and freedom of action.188 
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As we move through the world, we perceive it through the frame of our individual 
perspective. Anchorage points are involved in establishing our perspective because they 
act as a ground or a horizon against which we perceive and move around. As Merleau-
Ponty explains, the act of perceiving is how we make meaning of what we perceive: 
The coast flows by before our eyes if we keep our eyes fixed upon the ship’s railing, 
while the boat moves when we stare at the coast. Of two luminous points in the 
dark, one immobile and the other moving, the one that we focus upon seems to be 
moving. The cloud flies over the steeple and the river flows beneath the bridge 
when we stare at the cloud or the river. The steeple falls through the sky and the 
bridge slides over the congealed river when we stare at the steeple or the bridge. 
What gives the status “moving object” to one part of the field, and the status 
“background” to another is the manner in which we establish our relations to it 
through the act of looking.189 
When we perceive, the eye is never a neutral object that records moving objects. The eye 
is directed to see some objects as moving and some as not depending on which anchorage 
points ground the body in the spectacle. As a component of our object-horizon visual 
structure, anchorage points must blur from view to make an object visible. Anchorage 
points are thus “not an explicit perception,” meaning, “they are not presented directly to 
our perception, they circumvent it and haunt it through a pre-reflective operation whose 
results appear to us as ready-made.”190 Much like a phantasmic horizon that pre-determines 
our relationships to others, anchorage points help us differentiate within our visual field 
that which we value as the figure and as the background.191  
Anchorage points are what give us a feeling of security and stability to move about in 
the world with confidence. The settler may find certainty to perform epistemological 
domination when their perspective becomes anchored in ways that organize the world in 
accordance with their sense of entitlement. The Caldwell land purchase perhaps 
exemplifies how settlers’ anchorage in the situation defined the value of the disputed 
object. The community saw the land through their individual and collective perspectives, 
which I have argued can be differentiated from Indigenous perspectives. From this 
 
189 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 290. 
190 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 292. 
191 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 289. 
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positionality, the value of the land was in its potential for farming. As discussed, Mackey 
points to this as a Lockean conceptualization of land. The land was not, for example, valued 
as an object that held potential for cultivating more equitable settler-Indigenous land 
relations. The former interpretation of land that settlers focused on reified their certainty of 
entitlement, whereas the latter threatened this certainty because it meant acknowledging 
sovereign partners who do not need superintending. Mackey points out that entitlement is 
the expected order for settlers because they believe it has been and therefore, always should 
be the natural state of affairs. The way that the Chatham-Kent community took up 
anchorage in the situation, maintained continuity between spatial levels to preserve their 
certainty.  
As we move through the world, we move through different spatial levels and take them 
up in accordance with other anchorage points that are presented to us. Our perception of 
these anchorage points is always the exercise of adjusting to and gearing into a new level. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the body’s adaptivity to new levels is necessary for allowing it 
to move with confidence from one spatial level to the next. When continuity is broken, 
such as when one enters a funhouse of oddly shaped mirrors, the body becomes disoriented. 
In such cases, the tasks one might find simple, such as walking around a corner or across a 
room, become difficult. The body must learn to move differently, and the confidence of 
bodily extension must be rebuilt to accommodate the situation. Finding confidence of 
movement in the funhouse happens because our bodies explore it and in exploring it, the 
body begins to know itself as capable of navigating that particular maze of mirrors.  
Drawing upon the visual experiments of George Stratton, Merleau-Ponty explains 
directionality as something that is not objective but found by the body. During these 
experiments, subjects who wear mirror inversion glasses for uninterrupted periods of time 
begin to sense a different placement of up from down based on their need to align their 
motility with their visual field.192 Objects and spatial relations that the body senses as 
 
192 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 256. “As soon as the tactile body links up with the visual body, the region of the 
visual field where the subject’s feet appeared ceases to be defined as “up.” This designation returns to the region where 
the head appears, and the region containing the feet again becomes “down.” 
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anchorage do not signal any real direction until our bodies make it real by finding their way 
around; as Merleau-Ponty explains, “What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not 
my body, such as it in fact exists, as a thing in objective space, but rather my body as a 
system of possible actions, a virtual body whose phenomenal “place” is defined by its task 
and by its situation. My body is wherever it has something to do.”193 What we understand 
to be up and down is based on what we perceive to be up and down and how our bodies 
find it. The exercise of wearing mirror inversion glasses induces a state of discontinuity 
when moving between spatial levels. Similarly, when we find our way around the 
funhouse, we are not moving in accordance with objective cardinal directions. When we 
walk “around” a slanted corner or “up” a slope and “diagonally down” a twisted staircase 
we determine what “around,” “up,” and “diagonally down” are in relation to the series of 
previous spatial levels we have moved through. Each new spatial level is encountered as 
sequential from the last, and we carry into the new spatial level the sedimented corporal 
knowledge of previous levels. Our bodies become adept at moving between levels by 
finding continuity between them. While our initial experiences in the funhouse are 
disorienting, spending uninterrupted time in the house allows our bodies to sediment new 
ways of navigating the world, until we eventually find continuity.  
As discussed, habitual perception and response emerges from the body’s sedimented 
experiences in the world that become pre-reflective. Taking our bodies from the work of 
walking to dancing, or from ballet to break dancing, are vague examples of where we can 
see our bodies draw upon our sedimentations. Our motility is intricate and nuanced; our 
sedimentations are drawn upon with every move we make, whereby some skills are 
selected while others are left behind. The movements of dance are comprised of much 
smaller and more intricate expressions of our body’s agility that simultaneously call upon 
the flex of muscles and movement of bones in complex coordination. But most importantly, 
these expressions happen in relation to space and to the very ground upon which the dancer 
dances, for we cannot feel ourselves kick up or to the left unless we perceive what down 
and right is.  
 
193 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 260. 
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Anchorage points become the perceptual frame in which we understand our bodies. 
They are the stabilizers through which the body’s perception and response faculties become 
habitual. This is to say that once inversion glasses are placed on the eyes, it interrupts pre-
reflective habits and the body must re-learn how to move about its environment. Moving 
from a spatial level that the body knows – prior to inversion glasses where the dresser, the 
keys and the door are as I know them – to a spatial level that is inverted induces 
disorientation because there is a break in perceptual continuity. If I enter a front hall that is 
inverted, my body is no longer sure about how to get to my keys and leave the house. 
If we understand settlers’ epistemological stance to be inextricably linked to the 
habitual faculties of the settler habit body, then settlers feel epistemological shifts. But 
more importantly, what does this feeling do for making settlers decolonial? Seen through 
the lens of the habit body, the axiomatic assumptions of settlers are more than a fallacious 
tale they tell each other, it is a feeling of well-being in their world. The experience of 
disorder that occurs when perceptual continuity is broken is not merely a thinking 
experience or a cognitive awareness of difference. As Merleau-Ponty argues, disorientation 
is the vital “experience of vertigo and nausea, which is the consciousness of, and the horror 
caused by, our contingency.”194 As I have discussed, the stability of our consciousness is 
dependent upon being able to perceive one moment from the next, but as a moment that is 
imminent yet related to our past and future aspirations. To become aware of how contingent 
the world is, creates uncertainty, yet it is also the contingency of the world that allows for 
change. Our aspirations are based on what we perceive is possible, or more specifically, 
our aspirations are formed at the intersection of our perception and our motility, which are 
inherently intertwined. 
The breaking of continuity is, therefore sensed by the settler, and it conjures a threat 
that is deeper than challenging the logic of an intellectual argument. When settlers’ 
property and expectant futures are suddenly threatened, they feel “endangered, uncertain 
and angry.”195 The unmooring causes them to latch onto what can make them feel secure, 
 
194 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 265. 
195 Mackey, Phenomenology, 19. 
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not necessarily what can be argued.196 To unmoor the settler elicits a change in their bodily 
comportment but not one that is likely to open them to new ways of sensing and acting. It 
tends to cause them to reach for certainty, to find continuity at any cost because they are 
under duress. At present, finding continuity is always available for them because the settler 
world offers more certainty for colonizing reaches than decolonizing reaches. In effect, 
making the settler uncertain works against opening them up to imagining material 
decolonization because it provokes them to claim colonialism as secure ground. 
I would also like to make clear that breaking perceptual continuity is not the same as 
interrupting the stream, which I have described alongside Ahmed as being a disruption. 
While it is true that I will stop or hesitate before I begin to gear into my now inverted world, 
I am feeling the pressure of threatening circumstances which is different from feeling the 
pressure of norms. Under this pressure, I feel unmoored because my body is between what 
it knows and what it does not yet know; I am being forced to re-learn myself in relation to 
the inverted space. This is a problematic strategy for the project of decolonization because 
as I have argued, settlers are embedded in a material world of colonization in which they 
know themselves. A world that is decolonial is not available for the settler to inhabit and 
re-learn themselves; they must participate in actively creating that world. For settlers to be 
decolonizing, they need to be moored – on some level – to the norms that comprise the 
material and phenomenal structure that they resist; to gear into this world is to know what 
is different from it and why it needs to change. The work of decolonization is in the 
changing of settler habits, in making a different comportment that modifies which 
sedimentations are employed and which are left behind. To change our comportment 
requires us to perceive the existing structure differently so our bodies gear into the world 
differently and change the phenomenal relation. This is how settlers’ bodies become 
decolonized as correlates to their surroundings, which become decolonized worlds.   
 
196 Mackey, Unsettled, 11. Settlers’ fantasies of entitlement, as Mackey explains, are emergent from “repetitive 
embedding and realizing of settler assertions of certainty and entitlement,” which entails the retelling of stories that are 
“grounded in delusions of entitlement based on arguments that should make no sense even to those who created them 
and turned them into laws.”  These rationales have a pattern of logic that are upheld by being socially embedded, not by 
being fact but by being an expectation that is carried out through settler bodies; living settlement is how these fantasies 
become true for the settler. 
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In this section, I have argued that challenges to settlers’ long-held arguments are felt 
because they are inextricably linked to their body’s sedimentations and habitual faculties. 
Unsettling their paradigms of knowing means unmooring their habitual faculties, which is 
not only an intellectual shift but a sensation of vertigo and nausea. Unmooring is sensed 
by the settler, and it conjures a threat that is deeper than challenging the logic of an 
intellectual argument because it makes them feel endangered. Unmooring thus causes 
settlers to latch onto what can make them feel secure and thus works against the prospects 
of decolonization because it provokes them towards reclaiming settlement. Although stops 
and interruptions are involved in the process of breaking the continuity, unmooring is not 
productive for performing decolonization because it eliminates the work of decolonization 
that is necessary to change the habits of settlers.  
Pressures and Turns 
The lines of settlement that bodies traverse are not seamless insular tunnels that make 
them impervious to the pressures of decisions. The repetitions of norms that we perform 
are applied to our choices and intentions and inform the movements and comportments we 
make. It does not follow that because we are gifted the lineage of colonialism settlers must 
reproduce it. The lines of colonialism are dotted with decisions and inclinations. Each of 
these dots are what Ahmed refers to as “stress points:” the points at which norms provide 
a source of stress, a “social pressure to follow a certain course, to live a certain life, and 
even to reproduce that life.”197 The accumulation of these stress points orients us to face 
the same way along the collective trajectory.  
To traverse lines of orientation, such as settlement, is to navigate in repetition the 
particulars of the outside world. Ahmed writes, “depending on which way one turns,” the 
objects and world presented to us changes.198 Which way we turn determines which objects 
are in reach.  Accessible arrangements of objects allow us to know ourselves; therefore, 
when settlers experience stress points and adjust or turn in accordance with them, the 
 
197 Ahmed, Queer, 17. 
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objects that appear become useful for understanding their conscious being as correlative to 
the normative structures. What does not come into view cannot influence the construction 
of settler consciousness. Lines of colonization face us away from the happenings that 
disrupt the collective trajectory when they turn us towards goals. As I have discussed, being 
taught to turn away from what is difficult makes determinant who is friend and who is 
stranger. Turning away in repetition sediments in our bodies whose lives matter. 
The lines towards our collective goal become an investment because they require the 
work of enduring the pressure of normativity. This pressure becomes familiar to our bodies, 
leaving impressions that change its surface. We feel this pressure as the reassurance of 
certainty; certainty that we will be directed by pressure. Our propensity to turn away from 
what we have been taught to ignore is a turning towards the familiarity that is the sensation 
of being pressed into becoming a settler. The ways that we perceive become habitual from 
navigating relationally to this pressure. The body’s comportment deals with this pressure 
by making itself small underneath it or shrugging and nodding off its adversaries to protect 
it. Turning towards what is difficult provides a pressure as well, but one that is unfamiliar. 
To turn towards causes a disruption, and the sensation of that disruption is always presented 
by a normative pressure that calls the event a disruption. These are the moments in which 
settlers must choose which burden of pressure they take up.   
I bring attention to these moments because it is overly simplistic to paint the 
experience of settler life as being unconstrained. Norms and epistemological slants are not 
experienced by settlers unproblematically. Their bodies are not free of the pressures to be 
settler, to achieve in the system of settlement by being productive. Interruptions to this 
productivity may come in the form of difficult encounters that threaten to rupture our 
knowing. These are the instances when we feel we must turn away in order to make our 
knowing make sense. The phenomenological implications for the settler who believes they 
know more and know better is an experience of contradiction. For our knowing to feel 
superior, we must also be conscious that there are other ways of knowing that we perceive 
to be lesser. Settlement in Canada claims its superiority on the assumption that its authority 
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is unproblematic.199 The events that challenge our knowing are those that reveal settlement 
to be problematic. These moments are the ones that call into question our norms, which 
imply a direction that is shared. Situations like these are phenomenal because they indicate 
the limits of our intellectual understanding. To turn away from grappling with what is 
difficult requires that we not know how the systems that benefit us are negatively afflicting 
others. Our becoming settler thus requires that we perform our knowing in ways that 
require knowing to not-know.200 To turn towards and engage with such confrontations is 
not an exercise of intellectually accepting this assertion; it is an exercise of practicing 
resiliency in the event of feeling ruptured. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have considered the intricacies of the settler habit body for 
understanding decolonization. Settlement needs to be understood as a structure that works 
through settler bodies, in which sedimentations of how to settle become habitual. The 
epistemological certainty and ontological expansiveness of the settler are not the source 
of settlement, but the reasoning and justification that is inextricable to what the settler 
body knows. The settler understands themselves to be omniscient because they take up 
this position in space and with each extension their reassurance that they belong 
everywhere becomes sedimented. Events that challenge settler entitlement are therefore 
not merely challenges to their intellectual arguments as much as they are challenges to 
their habit bodies, which feel the affects as disorientation. Changes to the continuity of 
settler’s perceptual anchorage are not useful for decolonization because they cause the 
settler to reclaim settlement. The work of decolonization must be done by settler bodies 
who feel the structure they resist so they can sense what decolonization is. The work of 
decolonization is thus the work of changing settlers’ habitual movements that seek out 
the certainty and familiarity of normative pressure. Learning how to be resilient and turn 
towards while being in the colonial world is learning to be decolonial. 
 
199 See introduction: “The underlying ideological assumption and legal attitude on which English colonialism in Canada 
rests is that their authority is always un-problematic and in being so, it can claim centrality.” 
200 Mills, 110. 
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Chapter Three: “Seeing With,” Across the Rows 
Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with confronting the problematic question of how settlers 
can restructure their habitual faculties and “see with” Indigenous peoples to form more 
equitable land relations. I employ key terms from critical phenomenologists Alia Al-Saji 
and Sara Ahmed (“seeing with,” critical-ethical vision, and stress points) to unpack the 
processes and affective implications of opening settlers’ habitual faculties. I draw from 
settler colonial studies scholars and Indigenous thinkers, philosophers and scholars to 
demonstrate the compatibility of Indigenous philosophies of treaty (Guswentha) and the 
phenomenological approach of “seeing with”. I conclude by offering some insights into the 
motivations that might bring settlers to do the difficult work of decolonization.  
In A Phenomenology of Critical-Ethical Vision, Alia Al-Saji contemplates the 
efficacy of seeing with others for reshaping vision. Building upon Merleau-Ponty and 
Henri Bergson, she revisits the claim that vision is inherently objectifying and categorizing 
to ask “can vision see differently? That is, can vision accommodate a critical reflection of 
its own conditions and an ethical attitude to otherness of what it sees?”201 For Al-Saji, 
objectifying vision is a habitual and sedimented way of seeing and learning. In which case, 
a critical vision – one that sees differently – must discern habits of objectified seeing and 
the social structures that contextualize and motivate their formation—what Gail Weiss has 
called their “social reference.”202 I draw upon Al-Saji’s work in this chapter and bring her 
ideas regarding critical-ethical vision in conversation with Ahmed’s lines of orientation to 
think through the hesitations and turns that the settler habit body is asked to make during 
performances of decolonization.  
While this chapter gives its focus to vision, seeing is discussed as one component 
of the sensing body that works in accordance with others. Vision and the limits of its 
capacity produces objectifying vision when it is taken to be the way of knowing, or as a 
 
201 Al-Saji, “Critical-Ethical,” 375. 
202 Al-Saji, “Critical-Ethical,” 375. 
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way of knowing isolated from the other affective faculties of the settler body. Al-Saji’s 
concept of critical vision is concerned with opening the habits of objectifying vision by 
seeing through the affective field – what is sensed – rather than just relying on the field of 
vision. The affective field is the integration of our sensing faculties, of which vision is 
merely a part. This would allow us to see “conditions that make visibility and 
objectification possible—conditions which are diacritical, social, historical and 
material.”203 Critical vision in this form would make apparent what is phantasmically 
present in the moment of seeing, what brings us to understand the figure and our 
relationship to them.  
However, as Al-Saji also points out, critical vision that is not also ethical is 
insufficient for seeing differently. She argues,  
The critical without the ethical remains detached from lived experience and risks 
falling back into the trap of totalizing vision—the desire to make all that is unseen 
visible in order to know and possess it. This is the equivalent of making visible the 
socially constituted subject-positions in which we find ourselves, but forgetting the 
diversity of subjectivities acting, responding and resisting therein (thus reducing 
the thickness of those subjectivities to their subject-positions).204 
To make critical vision ethical, the seer must see themselves as implicated in these systems 
and dimensions, complicitly or otherwise. To see critically the conditions in which the 
other lives is not as sufficient as also seeing our involvement in how those conditions arise 
and are reproduced. Conversely, having an ethical vision that is not also critical risks 
obscuring the differentiations of our experiences within power structures and histories, 
which leads us to believe our sufferings and successes are unrelated to those of the other. 
The integration of critical and ethical is thus required for seeing differently.  
In the first section of this chapter, I bring together Al-Saji’s work on critical-ethical 
vision and Sara Ahmed’s ideas on stress points to problematize the settler habit body. I 
argue that taking up the project of “seeing with” others is advantageous for settler 
performances of decolonization. To “see with” allows the settler to critically interrogate 
 
203 Al-Saji, “Critical-Ethical,” 375. 
204 Al-Saji, “Critical-Ethical,” 376. 
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their perspective to reshape the way that they see. It also allows the settler possibilities for 
ethically engaging in this work by reflecting on their complicity in the matters of 
colonialism. I also discuss what seeing critically-ethically might mean for restructuring 
what settlers know, whereby they shift from relating to others as the knower into relating 
as a knower amongst others.  
In part two of this chapter, I discuss the usefulness of “seeing with” for 
performances of decolonization in regard to the original agreements of treaty. I look to the 
Two Row Wampum – or the Guswentha – as an example of how settlers could maintain 
treaty. Wampum, as it relates to settlement, represents a series of treaties developed during 
the 17th century between the Haudenosaunee (the Five Nations of the Iroquois) and the 
Dutch settlers in New Netherland (New York).205 More specifically, wampum provides a 
strategy for equitable relations and respectful coordination concerning the maintenance of 
partnerships. I argue that the habitual faculties of the settler body make it efficacious for a 
decolonizing program that is guided by the principals of the Guswentha because habit 
construction is adaptable. If relations are attended to in ways that create habits of “seeing 
with” then decolonization is possible.206 I bring in Al-Saji’s point that social structures and 
the lived experiences of individuals are interrelated concerning the institution of norms. 
This means that decolonizing settler bodies and decolonizing instituted structures is an 
inherently conjoined project. Turning toward thus induces alterations to what is normative, 
in which case, the project of decolonization can initiate a shift from the uncomfortable 
work of enduring oscillating pressures during inassimilable events until the repetition of 
these acts is felt as the normative pressure. I conclude that turning towards and performing 
acts of decolonization can be taken on by the body as a habitual way of being in the world, 
and to reshape normative structures that, in turn, encourage the settler to be decolonial. 
Ultimately, this chapter argues that setter conduct in settler-Indigenous relations is 
habitual and is, therefore, adaptable and open to restructuring. My argument in part one 
 
205 Ganondagan. 
206 My emphasis on guided is to distinguish “seeing with” from appropriation, which is a difference made clear in Al-
Saji’s concept of “seeing with.” 
81 
 
picks up and investigates Eva Mackey’s question, “how can we listen to others when we 
already know?”207 My discussion in part two aims to take this investigation from 
understanding how settlers can do differently into the more concerning question of why 
settlers would take up the task of decolonizing work. 
Objectifying Vision and the Affect of Hesitation 
Objectifying vision emerges when the conditions of what we see become invisible. 
In previous chapters, I have discussed the body as the unimplied third term in the object-
horizon structure of seeing. I have summarized Merleau-Ponty’s work to explain that the 
objects we gaze upon are seen by way of diacritical dimensions that makes the object 
visible to us – the plays of light and shadow that our vision works with to differentiate 
objects from their surroundings. I have also discussed the social structures – or norms – 
that have become institutionalized and that phantasmically disappear at the moment they 
shape our vision. But the physiognomy of my body – my two eyes in the front of my head 
– also contribute to the formation of my perspective because I cannot see from every 
perspective at once and I also cannot see myself seeing. 208 My gaze casts itself into objects, 
which solicit my intentions, and they become objects for my gaze because I try to make 
sense of them. The situatedness of my body as a pair of eyes that exist in a particular point 
in space is forgotten along with the disappearing horizons that determine how and what I 
see. I thus take the object to be fully present to me and in its “natural” state.209 This self-
erasure contributes to the ways that privileged bodies see others as morally deficient as 
opposed to navigating systems of coercion, and it is what prohibits our habits of seeing to 
appear uncomplicated and “natural.”   
 
207 Mackey, Unsettled, 132. 
208 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 94. “The tip of my nose and the contours of my eye sockets are all that I see of my 
own head. I can, of course, see my eyes in a three-faced mirror, but these are the eyes of someone who is observing, and 
I can barely catch a glimpse of my living gaze when a mirror on the street unexpectedly reflects my own image back at 
me.” 
209 Merleau-Ponty, Primacy, 167/29; Al-Saji, “Critical-Ethical,” 379. Al-Saji quotes Merleau-Ponty: Objectifying vision 
“works in and without us; it hides itself in making the object visible. To see the object, it is not necessarily not to see the 
play of shadows and light around it. The visible in the profane sense forgets it premises.” 
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What is lost to vision is the relationality of my body to the object that I gaze upon. 
My social positionality, my physical positionality in space and the scope of my vision all 
shape my ability to perceive and are forgotten during the encounter. My relationship to the 
object is severed, and I understand myself as unrelated to it. To see an object is thus to not 
see the conditions in which it is seen. As I have also discussed, this is why the 
epistemological domination performed by settlers is a certainty of knowing that is also a 
knowing not to know; for the settler to understand their knowing, it must appear against 
ways of knowing that make their knowing appear to them as superior.  
While these conditions may elude us when our sight defines the object, we can still 
sense their presence. Our eyes may not be able to see themselves seeing, but our other 
faculties of sensing are implicitly present with our bodies. We can see others responding 
to our seeing, which makes us aware of ourselves as seers, or as Merleau-Ponty states, “ 
through other eyes we are for ourselves fully visible.”210 What disappears so we can see 
the figure is what Merleau-Ponty refers to as “felt in our experience as no more than a 
certain lack.”211 In not having enough of the frame visible, in having parts of it lacking – 
invisible or obscured – we come to see a particular object by seeing it in a particular way. 
This invisible yet felt experience is exemplified in settlers’ performances of 
epistemological domination, wherein they claim space as specialists of knowing who are 
most equipped to address settler-Indigenous land issues. During these performances, the 
conditions that make Indigenous presence appear to settlers as inferior, disappears in the 
moment of perception. But the settler’s sense of superiority, their sense of their body’s “I 
can,” is inherently tied to their sense that Indigenous peoples cannot because they perceive 
under horizons of institutionalized hierarchies.  What is forgotten during the encounter are 
the social, historical, material, and diacritical conditions that have become settlers’ 
sedimented understandings of settler-Indigenous relations, but these elements are always 
present as affect because they are implicit in forming perception. 
 
210 Merleau-Ponty, Visible/Invisible, 143. 
211 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 153/179. 
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For settlers to know themselves as the knower over the known, they must also know 
to not know, or more pointedly, to not heed the affective weight of what they can feel but 
cannot see. This is to say that when settlers endure points of pressure, their choice to endure 
under the weight of what is familiar requires them to ignore the pressure that makes the 
familiar strange or that threatens their sense of familiarity. The ways in which they perceive 
Indigenous presence is habitual but so is their inclination to stay the normative course, as 
turning away becomes habitual. Turning away during encounters thus shapes what settlers 
understand the practical possibilities to be; the “I can” of their body who knows itself in 
the world.  
In her discussions on critical-ethical vision, Al-Saji understands realms of visuality 
as overlapping with affectivity during objectifying vision. Al-Saji explains this overlap as, 
“The realm of visible objectivity is, [then,] narrower than that of affectivity.”212 While the 
dimensions that imbue the object with their qualities become invisible to vision, they are 
not lost to our senses: 
With respect to the world, systems of diacritical difference, the histories of 
oppression and social structures that allow meaning to appear are seen only insofar 
as they are reduced to the attributes of objects. While these dimensions work in us 
and affect us, invisibly and unconsciously, allowing us to see, it is by means of their 
elision that the realm of visible objectivity is defined. This is to say that such 
dimensions – whether material, diacritical, historical, or social, whether bodily or 
worldly – have affective but not “objective existence.213 
What is affectively present, shapes what we see and gives meaning to the figure, and this 
meaning is understood to be innate to them.  This is how meaning comes to appear in the 
first place as part of the situation that our bodies make by being in the world. What we see 
is not all that we can sense. In which case, the dimensions that are elided can be found by 
looking to affection. 
I understand this overlap of affect and visible objectivity to be present at the 
moment of initial interpellation when the settler encounters what is difficult. These events 
 
212 Al-Saji, “Critical-Ethical,” 379. 
213 Al-Saji, “Critical-Ethical,” 379. 
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would include any situation in which the settler feels the instability of their sense of 
entitlement, such as being told they are not welcome in particular spaces. In moments such 
as these, the settler is confronted with complications that threaten the stability of their 
settlement narratives, which secure their right to be everywhere and know everything. The 
settler body feels the vulnerability of its sense of normalcy, to rupture. The oscillations of 
pressures that accompany the visual event signify the space in between sedimentation and 
habitual response. It is in this space that the settler body might leave its habitual perception 
unquestioned and shift into defending their entitlement, to close down the feeling of 
discomfort or fear. This is the seamless performance that Al-Saji argues can be opened up 
if we attentively employ hesitation before we act.  
In considering what constitutes critical vision,  Al-Saji discusses the tactic of 
hesitation as an affective strategy for interrupting the unconscious flow from habitual 
perception to response. She argues that hesitation “creates an opening in habits and makes 
them visible for themselves and within the world.”214 By delaying habitual reaction, 
hesitation “open[s] the way from affectivity to memory.”215 The body, in this moment, has 
the time to feel and remember, and in doing so does not automatically repeat the past but 
remembers it. As Al-Saji argues, “Through affect, the body waits before acting; it has the 
time not only to perceive, but also to remember. It is in this way that affect symbolizes, for 
Bergson, a body’s hold on time, its duration. For to feel is to no longer to repeat the past 
automatically, but to imagine and remember it.”216 While the settler may not be able to see 
all that is hidden, they can “marginally” encounter “the surprised revelation of a blind spot 
in vision, of invisibles to which vision is indebted.” 217 This is how habit becomes visible 
in memory so it can be reflected upon. 
Visualizing habit, as Al-Saji suggests is not completely dissimilar to the example 
of dance I have discussed alongside Helen Ngo and Merleau-Ponty. Visualizing the habits 
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of taking up dance can come in the form of a teacher or peers who assess a dancer’s 
performance – their habits of movement – as part of the process through which the dancer 
hones their craft. In this case, the dancer must “see with” her teacher and peers and merge 
their perspective with what she senses to be her own, in order to successfully integrate new 
moves and sedimentations. However, unlike the settler, the dancer comes to this task aware 
that she does not know how to adapt her body to the new style of dance. The dancer then 
takes the perspectives of others to be insightful and valuable; she does not assume she 
knows more or better. She is also willingly adapting her body to new rules because she 
senses the value of the dance form. In which case, the dancer seeks not to hesitate but to 
repeat the past, to sediment in her body the new form of movement. The dancer’s process 
exemplifies habit change that is possible were settlers to “see with” their sovereign 
partners. However, settler bodies are immersed in the structure of settlement, which shapes 
their habitual faculties in ways that devalue Indigenous perspectives. Hesitation is therefore 
valuable for the settler because it creates an opening through which they can marginally 
encounter their habits.  
Epistemological domination is such a habit, a tendency for settlers to behave as if 
they know best how to take actions when problems arise. In Unsettled Expectations, 
Mackey recounts an instance where a settler community member from Seneca Falls, New 
York, took a risk and attempted to connect with the Cayuga Nation without reproducing 
the domineering dynamics of settled relations. The local towns of Seneca Falls, Union 
Springs and Ithaca had expressed hostility towards the Cayuga because of their land claim, 
which had been tied up in legalities since 1980. Julie Uticone became concerned about the 
situation in 1999, which she saw as rapidly escalating.218 In response to the growing 
climate of hate, Uticone reached out to the Cayuga Nation to find out what she should do, 
instead of turning away from the situation or deciding amongst other settlers what should 
be done. According to Mackey, Julie “took the risk to reach out to cross the historical 
binary boundaries and distance that often exists between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
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people.”219 Julie did not assume the right to determine the best course of action without 
consulting with the Cayuga, nor did she assume she knew how to support them. When her 
connection to the Cayuga was eventually established, new alliances were formed.  Julie 
and her husband founded the group SHARE (Strengthening Haudenosaunee American 
Relations through Education), which was openly supported by Bernadette “Birdie” Hill, 
Heron Clan Mother of the Cayuga Nation.  
Julie’s hesitation was born out of her awareness that the habitual tendencies of 
settlers to “help” Indigenous peoples are often paternalistic and ethnocentric. But how she 
acted in the moment, how she extended her body, came with feelings of uncertainty 
regarding how she might jeopardize her membership in her community and how she might 
be received by the Cayuga. These are the pressures that Julie felt when she stopped in the 
stream to consult with the Cayuga on where and how to turn. Hesitation is where the body 
has time to perceive and remember, to no longer repeat the past, but it is a sensed 
experience. What became visible to Julie was that she had a blind spot, which she felt as 
her inability to know what to do and how to proceed without reproducing colonizing 
relations. Julie established new relations because her body found them in the world. The 
shift from hesitation to memory is therefore not just a cognitive adjustment, but a way of 
relearning the world with our bodies.  
According to Al-Saji, memory must take two implicated forms for us to visualize 
habits. The first is memory of the present – “the diacritical and seemingly formal conditions 
of actual visibility – the structures, social and otherwise, that configure what we see.”220 
The second is the memory of the past, including a memory of what was never present for 
our vision – “the habitualities and sedimentations, the instituted ways of seeing and vertical 
historicity, that make my vision what it is in the present.” Critical memory that is limited 
to remembering only the present misses the material and historical grounds of vision and 
how “a way of seeing, and of making visible comes to be instituted as a system of visibility 
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that counts.”221 What is habitual in settler bodies has a past. This past is the blind spot in 
their vision where the partiality and situatedness of their vision and its social reference to 
a particular order of difference and meaning, become the norm.222 Al-Saji argues that while 
critical vision does not make this blind spot visible explicitly, it appears marginally and 
affectively by revealing “coincidence” to be a “constituted” and “anticipating” way of 
seeing.223 Hesitation thus makes space for affectivity to move into critical memory, to 
reveal one’s seeing as situated. 
The role of critical memory is beneficial for opening the seam between 
sedimentation and habitual faculties because it reworks pre-reflective inclinations. Critical 
memory, as Al-Saji describes it, has three purposes as it pertains to opening habit. 
First, it is the memory of habituation; it serves to contextualize and historicize our 
habits, to show them as habits. Secondly, the memory itself is already a 
destabilization of habit; it replaces the performance of habit. And, thirdly, memory 
connects habit to its dynamic temporal and affective ground, to the duration that 
makes habit possible, even while it is being continually reconfigured by habits 
acquired. This duration is more than any given habit; it is, in Merleau-Ponty’s 
terms, the pre-personal dimension of embodiment that permits not only habit 
formation, but also change.224 
Hesitating that leads to critical memory then, fractures habituality by re-presenting the 
perceived naturalness of habit as habit, by getting in the way and interrupting the body’s 
pre-reflective tendencies, and by revealing habits to be temporally constructed. In regard 
to the reliance habit has on duration, this perhaps speaks of the moments of agency where 
one has the ability to alter their habits. Just as Ahmed recognizes stress points along lines 
of orientation as points where turning is possible, conceptualizing habits as formed over 
time allows one to grasp the malleability of their habit formation. In other words, duration 
is required to make habits and thus make new habits to alter our pre-reflective inclinations. 
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The project of critical vision, as described thus far, is a vision that sees social 
structures in generalizing terms; in ways that are “oddly unsituated and disembodied.”225 
To amend this, Al-Saji asserts that hesitation must also not forget “the heterogeneity of the 
ways in which these structures are taken up, lived, repeated and subverted – a heterogeneity 
which means that these structures are not monolithic but shift.”226 Seeing critically is not 
merely a project of seeing social structures or the history of them, but also how they are 
interconnected to one’s positionality and complicity within them. In which case, hesitation 
is useful for settlers to see the colonial legacy as implicated in producing their current 
conditions, but also as the ways that their complicity recreates their status as beneficiary. 
The moment of hesitation, as Al-Saji explains it, is an opening for possibility but 
the affective experience of this space is not consistent across bodies. While she describes 
it as an  “openness to alterity in experiences of waiting, wonder and surprise,” this is not 
necessarily the case for privileged bodies.227 Indeed, I do not think this account properly 
describes the settler experience. Hesitation for the settler entails making space to see 
marginally and affectively, which is a difficult encounter with beginning to know that 
which they know to not know. I argue that although hesitation offers settlers possibilities 
to see the social structures, diacritical dimensions, and their positionality to their others, 
hesitation is the moment when they engage in the discomfort of grappling and negotiating 
between turning towards what feels familiar and turning towards what feels uncertain. 
These moments are what Al-Saji refers to as an affectivity that feels “powerless,” whereby 
openness to alterity is taken up in “an attitude of self-conservation and closure – especially 
when it is one’s privileged positionality and the imaginary seamlessness of one’s bodily 
capacities that are at stake.”228 She argues that in response, there must be an attentive effort 
made to maintain the moment of hesitation and remain in the feeling of powerlessness, 
which is generative because it lets in other ways of seeing that challenge our own. 
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At this point, I wish to come back to Ahmed’s insights on becoming an obstacle 
along communal lines of orientation because it intersects with Al-Saji’s ideas regarding 
hesitation. The affective weights they both describe are useful for making tangible that 
which cannot initially be objectified. For Al-Saji, hesitation is needed “not only in order to 
reveal the play of social structures and diacritical dimensions, but also in order to show 
how the weight of multiple pasts, of historicity and habituation, institute and naturalize 
these structures while at once fracturing their consistency and stability.”229 For Ahmed, 
becoming an obstacle is to become an inconvenience to the stream, to feel the pressure of 
the conditions that stop you from stopping, as a tangible thing. What is made tangible can 
then be reshaped by turning a different way and forging a new path for bodies to take up. 
What they both motion towards is the immersion of bodies in the interplay between one’s 
individual lived experience and the structures that become institutionalized. This is where 
one feels the weight of having to negotiate the volatile process of becoming certain and the 
vulnerability of that certainty to repetitive ruptures. However, these are also the moments 
that are fruitful for altering the course of what has been, which could be why the oscillations 
of pressures are intense. Hesitating or becoming an obstacle by stopping fractures the 
consistency of the stream, whereby what is streaming must build up behind the body who 
waits, eventually move around it or follow the new course it forges when it turns towards.  
The negotiations that settlers endure when they hesitate are at once productive for 
maintaining and reshaping the institutionalization of social structures and diacritical 
dimensions. Seeing marginally and affectively itself constitutes a difficult encounter for 
the settler, mainly because their sense of superiority is illuminated as hierarchically 
constructed with negative implications for Indigenous peoples. What the settler perceives 
to be a norm – a direction that is shared – is revealed to be a purposeful illusion for their 
benefit. Bringing attention to settlers’ affective scope in the areas where it is wider than 
their objective vision reveals their knowing to be partial. But let us not forget that during 
this work the settler is not alone, as these tensions are socially structured. He/She/They 
is/are presented with difficult encounters because other ways of seeing and knowing 
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challenge their expectations and put their sense of entitlement in question. The stream then 
becomes oscillating pressures of push and pull when inassimilable events arise. 
Inassimilable events are what I have discussed as difficult encounters that 
interpolate us affectively. These occurrences are those that we cannot explain using our 
instituted system of meaning.230 Al-Saji argues that there are two ways of seeing such 
events. The first is by refusing to see them in any other way than through the normative 
organization of the field. This is what Merleau-Ponty refers to as a “pathological” response, 
whereby the normative schema of objectifying vision is willfully maintained even though 
the affectivity cannot be reconciled with the history and sociality of the level. This vision 
is unhesitating and seeks to assimilate the seen into its already established ways of 
knowing. Moving from level to level in this instance requires no change in habitual 
faculties. I understand this pathological vision to be the more certain choice for settlers 
who encounter difficult events; the choice that knows to not know. 
The second way of seeing inassimilable events is by “seeing with” others. This 
requires one to hesitate and allow the event to “insinuate into our vision as the dimension 
according to which the visual field is restructured,” which changes how we see.231 Al-Saji 
discusses the two ways in which one can “see with.” The first sees others as familiar, but 
to whom we are indifferent. This form of “seeing with” risks becoming objectifying vision 
because it elides “the lateral dependence of my vision upon others whose affective 
influence is appropriated or denied.” Problematically, this “seeing with” serves to render 
vision as neutral, impartial and the seen as inassimilable.232 The second form of “seeing 
with” draws upon hesitation as an attentive effort to hold open possibilities of seeing 
according to the aspects of the field of vision that have become invisible because they are 
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subsumed or excluded from what we see.233 This “seeing with” holds the potential for 
allowing us to see in ways that correspond to others 
 “Seeing with” in its second form is what Al-Saji argues makes critical vision 
ethical. It is not to see through the eyes of the other, nor dismiss what they see as inferior 
to our ways of seeing. “Seeing with” is to comprehend that our own eyes are already other 
because they belong to a system of vision in which our quotidian existence with others is 
visible and invisible to us.234 To approach our vision with such reflexivity is to recognize 
“the obligation of a shared vision,” the maintenance of which is the difficult effort of being 
attentive to our co-existence with others.235 This is perhaps the form of “seeing with” found 
in the actions of Julie Uticone. Julie was aware that her view of the situation belonged to a 
larger structure that typically treated Indigenous sovereignty in paternalistic and 
ethnocentric ways. Perhaps when she hesitated, Julie was determined to make an attentive 
effort to hold open the possibilities of “seeing with” the Cayuga, who were typically 
excluded. 
When we hesitate and allow events to insinuate into our vision and alter the way 
we see, anchorage inherently plays an important role. To understand our own vision as 
implicated in social structures and diacritical dimensions that we have inherited by way of 
the colonial legacy is to acknowledge that the sedimentations we have acquired correspond 
to the current state of colonialism that we actively take up with our everyday lives. How 
we take up anchorage, how we place our self in space, provides a starting point for 
affectively investigating what we – and those who came before us – can only marginally 
perceive. Instead of pathologically ignoring the affective weight of difficult events by 
preserving the perspective of one’s anchorage, settlers can use hesitation to investigate 
their anchorage with the intention of purposefully performing its re-arrangement. If we 
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bring attention to our affected state when we extend into spaces and place importance on 
what our bodies feel when we think we know, we might realize we know more, and we 
know better. “Seeing with” is thus a way of seeing that challenges the epistemological 
stance of the knower over the known but it offers settlers the opportunity to re-understand 
themselves as a knower in co-existence with others.  
In this section, I have put Al-Saji’s ideas regarding “seeing with” in conversation 
with Ahmed’s concept of stress points to further problematize the settler habit body. I have 
discussed the importance of affect during difficult encounters, especially inassimilable 
events where the settler must comprehend circumstances that cannot be explained by their 
frames of knowing. Performing hesitation attentively during these moments is important 
for opening up the habitual faculties of the settler, so they can marginally see the blind spot 
in their vision. Their critical vision must also be ethically taken up, meaning, settlers must 
face up to the ways that their positionality and complicity are implicated in the social 
structures and diacritical dimensions that shape how they see and what this means for their 
being beneficiaries of these structures. Maintaining the moment of hesitation in this way is 
the difficult and uncomfortable work of enduring the oscillating pressures of powerlessness 
and possibility for change. The choices that settlers make, in coordination with their others, 
have the potential to maintain the colonial legacy or reshape it. 
I have also discussed “seeing with” as a constructive tool for opening the habitual 
faculties of the settler. By focusing on the field of affect that is wider than the scope of 
their vision, the settler can tap into knowledge that previously went unnoticed or perhaps 
ignored. While “seeing with” challenges the settler’s epistemological inclination to 
dominate others with their certainty of knowing, it also opens them up to new ways of 
knowing that include knowing themselves as a knower amongst others. “Seeing with,” I 
argue, is an appropriate way to address  Mackey’s concern regarding how settlers can see 
when they think they know. However, it still remains that the work of “seeing with” feels 
difficult, as it requires enduring the oscillating pressures of uncertainty while new ways of 
seeing and being the world become sedimented. Even if settlers acknowledge that they 
have the capacity to “see with,” I question what would make them want to take up the 
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arduous task of seeing differently. The following section seeks to unpack why settlers 
might turn towards the task of grappling with inassimilable events to reshape their habits.  
Affect, Motivation, and Change 
While this thesis approaches decolonization by problematizing settler bodies, 
decolonization is necessarily a joint effort between Indigenous peoples and settlers.  I have 
sought to integrate Al-Saji’s work, specifically, into this project because it discusses 
“seeing with” as a practice that avoids the pitfalls of inassimilable events; mainly, the two 
dominating moves of appropriation or denial of other ways of knowing. Instead, “seeing 
with” requires “lateral passivity,” which is to remember the affective dependence on 
alterity and understand this dependency as “the obligation of a shared vision.”236 But most 
importantly, as Al-Saji argues, a shared vision is not a philosophical reflection with an 
epistemological beginning, but a shift in visual practices that are “a change at the level of 
habits of seeing to interrupt the seamless objectifying representation and the exclusions 
this implies.”237 Seeing attentively then requires holding open the moment of hesitation, 
feeling the oscillations of pressures, and responding under the affective weight of sensing, 
feeling, checking, and questioning.  
At this point, I want to turn back to Mackey’s work to illuminate the ways that it 
also sees decolonization as action, or as she phrases it, “treaty as a verb.” To perform 
decolonization is to perform treaty, and for settlers this means taking responsibility for 
upholding the agreements that were made and through which they benefit. Although I have 
attempted to complicate Mackey’s insights by arguing that settlers’ obstacles to 
decolonization pertain to their body’s “I can” rather than only their epistemological 
paradigms, I am merely trying to locate the affective point of possibility which I see as a 
viable opening for settlers to begin acquiring new habits of conduct. But to be clear, my 
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intention is to provide an argument that emphasizes the need for settlers to perform treaty 
as an essential point of departure.  
A general model for how settlers can partner and maintain treaty is perhaps best 
described by The Covenant Chain, which represents a series of treaties developed during 
the 17th century between the Haudenosaunee (the Five Nations of the Iroquois) and the 
Dutch settlers in New Netherland (New York). The Covenant Chain is depicted in 
Guswentha, or more specifically the Two Row Wampum treaty belt, which shows five 
stripes of alternating white and purple rows running parallel along the length of the belt. 
At the center of the belt, between the purple rows, are rows of white that represent the space 
of relations between people.  
 
Fig. 1: Two replica teaching wampum belts. The bottom belt indicates the alliance between the Six Nations 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy – the Mohawks, Senecas, Oneidas, Cayugas, Onondagas, and Tuscaroras – and the British 
Crown. The top belt is the Two Row wampum. 
There are many interpretations of wampum that discuss the autonomy and the 
interrelatedness of the purple rows. Some of which understand the rows to be expressions 
of difference, “paths that never converge,” and clear and permanent separations of 
nations.238 Other interpretations focus on the three beaded rows between the purple rows, 
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which represent the three principals of conduct: friendship, peace, and longevity.239 In 
either case, the middle rows are the space in which the relationship is conducted, built over 
time and into the future. As the initial Dutch treaty proposal is recorded in the 
Haudenosaunee tradition,  
You say you are our father and I am your son. We say, We will not be like Father 
and Son, but like Brothers. This wampum belt confirms our words. These two rows 
will symbolize two paths or two vessels, travelling down the same river together. 
One, a birch bark canoe, will be for the Indian people, their laws, their customs and 
their ways. The other, a ship, will be for the white people and their laws, their 
customs and their ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in 
our boat. Neither of us will make the compulsory laws not interfere in the internal 
affairs of the other. Neither of us will try to steer the other’s vessel. The agreement 
has been kept by the Iroquois to this date.240 
Treaty, as it is conducted through wampum, is not meant to be a paternalist relationship, 
but one of respectful autonomy and interdependence. As Susan Hill has argued, without 
the three principals that bind the vessels together, “the two vessels could drift apart and 
potentially be washed onto the bank (or crash into the rocks). This agreement was meant 
to provide security for both sides.”241 
Wampum as Daniel Heath Justice describes, is a writing technology used 
extensively throughout the Eastern Woodlands of North America.242 He explains that 
“wampum functions most significantly – and successfully – when it is in relationship with 
a living people who are literate in its meaningful textual traditions” – traditions of 
representation in communities and histories – as well as the traditions of wampum belt 
production.243 Both aspects of tradition “are constitutive participants in the meaning 
making of wampum exchange; they are not simply the medium through which the 
exchange takes place.”244 As master storyteller Tehanetorens (Mohawk) describes, 
“Wampum strings served as credentials or as a certificate of authority. No Iroquois chief 
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would listen to a messenger or pay attention to a report until he received official 
information through a runner who carried the proper wampum string or belt. Wampum 
guaranteed a message or a promise. Treaties meant nothing unless they were accompanied 
by wampum. Belts were given and received at treaties as seals of friendship.”245 
I pair in this discussion the Guswentha with Al-Saji’s “seeing with” because I find 
in them an intersection that is useful for conceptualizing aspirations for the settler habit 
body. The relations that the Guswentha represents are complex in the ways that they 
understand the negotiations between autonomy and interdependence to be in flux. This 
definition conflicts with Western enlightenment frameworks, which understand “property-
based assumptions about autonomy, freedom and property as boundedness and 
separation.”246 As Mackey writes, “Western frameworks conceive of autonomy in terms 
of one nation, one community and one singular peoples with clear boundaries and fences 
in between: in some ways, autonomy is seen as a kind of property.”247  
In contrast, the flexibility of autonomy that the Guswentha understands differs in 
its sophisticated focus on being autonomous within tensions of relations. Its attention to 
non-fixed ways of understanding autonomy are akin to what Kyle Whyte describes as 
collective continuance: 
When we zoom in on experience and time, collective continuance refers to an 
understanding of existence as living through diverse, constantly changing 
relationships with different species, ancestors, future generations, and spiritual and 
ecological beings (e.g. water). These relationships are infused with responsibilities. 
So, continuance refers to living through constant motion and diversity within a 
collective of responsibility-laden relationships.248   
Whyte describes this style of relating as one that embraces “migration, motion, fluidity, 
vibration, and expansion/contraction,” and thus provides an adaptive capacity and fluidity 
that supports moral relationships across durations of diverse conditions.249 Collective 
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continuance, as Whyte describes it, is what colonialism seeks to erase, and it does so by 
fixing Indigenous mobility and migration for the purposes of settlement and land claims.  
 As discussed, performances of settlement carried out by settler bodies are habits 
that require maintenance and that are therefore open to be re-directed towards different 
ends, such as decolonization. It is this adaptive quality that I find to be a complimentary 
attribute for rebuilding settler habitual faculties in coordination with the Guswentha. The 
concept of the Guswentha requires the task of renewal, or what is referred to as “polishing 
the covenant chain.”250 Caring for the chain in this way means we are “aware that the 
relationship is not new, that it is not beginning now; it has roots deep in the past and it 
changes over time.”251 To polish is to renew what is already there, to actively engage in 
flexible ways in a joint project to establish positive relations. The habit body that can bring 
itself to perform this type of work is one that is anchored in their row and is aware that 
their vision is not their own but a form of vision that is bound up with ways of seeing. It is 
also a body that is attentive, aware, and hesitating because it is actively restructuring – or 
polishing – its vision while it is learning itself in the rows of peace, friendship and 
longevity. The flexibility of this task is to find certainty not in the rigidity of an autonomy 
that seeks to fix relations, but in the certainty of trusting our partners during the ebbs and 
flows of conditions that are constantly in flux. These are the kinds of equitable relations 
that take time to develop and that settlement has sought to damage. But by actively 
engaging with this work within the middle Guswentha rows, while utilizing the adaptive 
qualities of our habit bodies to “see with”, we can begin to know ourselves differently, 
extend with confidence, and start to imagine the possibilities for changing the course of 
settlement.  
For my final transition, I want to turn towards the difficult question that this thesis 
means to address: Why would settlers do this work? Colonization is a line that has been 
traversed for centuries, and for individual settlers this means the inheritance of a lineage 
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that binds them to other settlers by way of collective labor to keep the path clear.252 The 
collective lines of direction that settlers take up are investments in communal hope because 
the longer we tread them the harder it is to deviate from the supported journey to get 
somewhere.253 This is perhaps why reshaping these lines as we turn different ways is 
sensed as heavy and laborious. Turning different ways requires us to engage with feelings 
of mourning and loss for a desired future, and the work of cobbling together new support 
systems. This endeavor is not an epistemological shift as much as it is an affective 
performance of learning to hesitate, “seeing with,” and taking up space differently; all of 
which are new ways of being in the world for the privileged body. Resiliency, dedication 
and commitment will therefore be vital for settlers to decolonize.   
In moments of hesitation, when our bodies are opening to perceive differently and 
deciding which way they should turn, the affective work may feel drastic. This is because 
the body in that moment is still facing what it stands to lose and how it knows itself. Once 
the body has turned towards, its perspective changes and new objects emerge in its 
perceptive fields to know itself differently; as Ahmed argues, “Depending on which way 
one turns, different worlds might even come into view.”254 Turning is thus effective for 
settlers becoming other than decolonizing, and perhaps most importantly because the more 
settlers repeat these turns their bodies acquire the shape of decolonization.255 Decolonizing 
turns then become performances that the settler body understands as an “I can” possibility. 
What eventually becomes familiar is the pressure of decolonizing turns. 
 Creating the habit of turning towards also alters the structures and dimensions of 
institutionalized norms. As discussed, social structures motivate us; they inform our 
habitual perception as sedimentations. The relationship between social structures and 
 
252 Ahmed, Living, 46. Ahmed discusses collective labor to keep the path clear as a support system. 
253 Ahmed, Living, 18. “You make an investment in going [on the path], and the going extends the investment. You keep 
going in hope you are getting somewhere. When we don’t give up, when we persist, when we are “under pressure” to 
arrive, to get somewhere, we give ourselves over to the line.” 
254 Ahmed, Queer, 15. 
255 Ahmed, Queer, 15. “If such turns are repeated over time, then bodies acquire the very shape of that direction. It is not, 
then, that bodies simply have a direction, or that they follow directions, in moving this way or that. Rather, in moving 
this way rather than that, and moving in this way again and again, the surfaces of bodies in turn acquire their shape. 
Bodies are “directed” and they take the shape of this direction.”  
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seeing is dialogical, we sense in accordance to these structures but by resisting them or 
turning a different way we alter them; Al-Saji describes this process when she writes, “The 
circularity between habit and institution, bodies and social horizons, means that vision is 
neither mere social construction nor individual accomplishment, but an institution and a 
historicity that is always taken up and resumed.”256 Colonization works through settler 
bodies, and this is how settlement is maintained as a material structure through which 
settlers know themselves as colonizers. But habit does not only recast settler bodies. Habit 
also makes the perceived world appear differently, or perhaps re-organized to fit our new 
ways of seeing. 257 In which case, restructuring habits will eventually allow us to see new 
possibilities and find different meanings and norms of settlement that take precedence over 
the need to reify certainty. The pressures of decolonizing turns, once felt as difficult 
encounters, may begin to feel normal, and with repetition may, even become habitual. This 
is how new structures of settlement can be built, by taking difficult turns and forging new 
paths until the quality of normative pressure changes. What then becomes possible for the 
settler is new ways of understanding their extensions into space, land relations, and what it 
means to polish the Covenant Chain.  
Conclusion 
 This final chapter has attempted to address the problematic question of how settlers 
can restructure their habitual faculties to see otherwise than objectifying vision. Alongside 
Al-Saji, I have argued that settlers can see affectively, within a critical-ethical vision, to 
confront their complicity in colonization and to re-know themselves as a knower amongst 
others. I have drawn an intersection between Al-Saji and Ahmed’s tactics of hesitation and 
stops to discuss settlement as coercive pressures and what it feels to endure those pressures 
while turning towards what is difficult. Negotiating within these pressures is productive 
for maintaining and reshaping the institutionalization of social structures and diacritical 
 
256 Al-Saji, “Critical-Ethical,” 387. 
257 Al-Saji, “Critical-Ethical,” 377. “But it is not only the body that is recast by habit, the perceived world is differentiated 
and configured in new ways; it appears differently. Indeed, visibility takes on a particular organization that corresponds 
to our habits of seeing; certain differences, and hence meanings, become salient while other dimensions are invisible.” 
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dimensions that bring us to re-producing settlement. To restructure the visual field by 
seeing affectively is how settlers can “see with” Indigenous perspectives in ways that avoid 
the pitfalls of appropriation or denial.  
I have also discussed how seeing affectively is a strategy that is complimentary to 
Guswentha and polishing the covenant chain. Bodily habits require maintenance, and as 
such they become malleable to new techniques for relating in the world. If settlers were to 
take up decolonizing action by polishing and renewing their relations to their sovereign 
partners, by giving affective weight to the autonomous and interconnected relationship they 
are enmeshed in, they could alter the character of settlement. Ultimately, our habits as 
settlers determine our expectations for the future, and as such, incremental changes to our 
habits bring different expectations for our futures into view. If we begin the sweaty work 
of decolonization, then we become open to new possibilities to express our agency and 
responsibly attend to the legacy of colonialism. How we do differently carries the potential 
to change why we want to be different.  
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